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WHO AUTHORS TRADEMARKS?
STEVEN WILF*
INTRODUCTION
This essay explores the role of public authorship in trademark,
a role that has been both taken for granted and ignored. Public
authorship has been taken for granted even as it has become em-
bedded in the concept of secondary meaning and other familiar
trademark doctrines. Nevertheless, the public's significance as
trademarK creator for ownership questions has rarely been ac-
knowledged. Although no other intellectual property regime
poses so many legal tests that depend upon public consciousness,
no other form of intellectual property provides so little corre-
sponding recognition of a public domain.
By associating a symbol with an object, the public contributes
to the authorship of trademarks. This associative power grants a
word or icon meaning as the representation of a particular object.
A major theme in this essay is the linking together of doctrinal
fragments to elaborate the circumstances and implications of the
public's role in creating intellectual property.
There is a countervailing tendency to identify the producer of
the trademark as the sole possessor of rights. It is the producer, so
the argument goes, who designs the mark and invests in its dissemi-
nation through advertising. Moreover, in Frank Schechter's classic
formulation, a trademark represents the good will accrued over
time. Society as a whole benefits from the trademark holder's
vested interest in maintaining quality across numerous transac-
tions. Since the trademark holder both invents and sustains the
worth of the mark, it is his or her claims to private ownership that
must be protected.'
Similar arguments about the investment of labor are often
used to legitimize tangible property. But here it is employed to
bolster private entitlements to language and iconography. Intellec-
* Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law, and Visiting Professor, University
of Connecticut School of Law. J.D.; 1995, Yale Law School; Ph.D., 1995, Yale University.
I would like to thank Ralph Brown, Wendy Gordon, Sarah Harding, and Steven Hey-
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I See Frank L. Schechter, Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REv. 813
(1927). For an extended discussion of Schechter's thesis, see infra Part II.
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tual property, I suggest, is different. 2 As a form of expression,
there is a clear and ever-present public role in shaping language.
Trademarks are even one step further from tangible property than
other species of intellectual property. Peculiar to trademarks, the
communicative sign is a placeholder for a robust but intangible
cultural relationship between producer and consumer. The very
existence of this relationship begs the question of the consumer's
creative role. One scholar has called trademarks "owning what
doesn't exist."3 This essay deals with the still more difficult prob-
lem of creating what does not exist. How do two parties with com-
peting interests (commercial entities and the public as interpreter)
work to create a trademark? What privileges emerge from this
joint authorship?
This essay is part of a larger scholarly enterprise to carve out a
more expansive public domain within the realm of intellectual
property and, more particularly, trademarks.4 It seeks to aim at the
very heart of the dilemma of public entitlement: reluctance of
courts to protect the use of intellectual property against its cre-
ators.5 If the public can be shown to be an author or symbolic
creator, then, perhaps the same authorial rights granted to individ-
ual creators (such as the person or corporation that affixes signs
2 For an opposing view, see Frank Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 108 (1990) (arguing for the treating of intellectual property as
largely identical with real property).
3 Stephen L. Carter, Owning What Doesn't Exist, 13 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 99 (1990)
(arguing that this non-tangible quality makes it hard to apply classic utilitarian analysis to
trademarks). A number of scholars have seen intangible property rights in government
licenses. See Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Scholars have also
recognized individual liberties to do as one wishes with one's body. See Bruce Ackerman,
Levels of Generality In Constitutional Interpretation: Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
317 (1992). Here I will suggest that the intangibility of trademarks, and the way they are
summoned into existence, invests interpretive powers in the public that create public prop-
erty rights.
4 On the need to craft new theories of the public domain, see David Lange, Recognizing
the Public Domain, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981); Jessica Litman, The Public Do-
main, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990).
5 Most notably, this reluctance has posed a significant threat to traditional First
Amendment rights. Examples include prohibitions against the use of a caricature of the
Reddy Kilowatt symbol in an environmental campaign against a power plant, see Reddy
Communications. Inc. v. Environmental Action Found., 477 F. Supp. 936 (D.C. 1979), and
the use of the five-ringed Olympic symbol by those opposed to the conversion of an
Olympic Village into a prison, see Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic
Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Similar restrictions have been placed upon non-political parodies. See, e.g., Dallas
Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1979) (en-
joining use of actresses in Dallas Cowboy cheerleader uniforms in pornographic film);
Coca Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (enjoining depic-
tion of the Coca-Cola sign with the words "enjoy cocaine"); Chemical Corp. of America v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962) (restricting use by insecticide manufac-
turer of modified beer slogan, "where there's life there's Bugs").
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upon consumer goods) can be attributed to the public as well.6
The problem of public entitlement is especially significant for
trademarks. Unlike copyright or patent, there is no set limit to the
time to which the privilege extends.7 And, unlike copyright, trade-
mark lacks a broad doctrine of fair use. Yet, even if trademark in-
cluded a more robust fair use exception, it might not provide an
answer to the problem of public domain. Copyright fair use has
been eroded through the courts' tendency to immunize creators
from responding to even compelling public interests.8 Therefore,
I have not suggested that a capacious fair use doctrine should be
extended to trademarks.9 Instead, I have focused upon the public
6 The clash between trademark law and Constitutional rights has spawned a large
scholarly literature. Often these works argue for the trumping power of First Amendment
rights. See, e.g., Mark A. Daglitz, Trademark Parodies and Free Speech: An Expansion of Parodists'
First Amendment Rights in L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 73 IOWA L. REV. 961
(1988); Harriet K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark, and Copyright:
Remedies without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REV. 923 (1985); Robert N. Kravitz, Trademarks, Speech,
and the Gay Olympics Case, 69 B.U. L. REv. 131 (1989). See also Kimberly A. Pace, The Wash-
ington Redskins Case and the Doctrine of Disparagement: How Politically Correct Must Trademarks
Be?, 22 Pepp. L. Rev. 7 (1994) (finding use of Lanham Act's scandalous mark clause viola-
tive of First Amendment rights).
As Cass Sunstein has suggested, however, astonishing changes in the diffusion of infor-
mation have raised the question of whether the First Amendment is capable of adequately
protecting public speech interests. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF
FREE SPEECH 1-16 (1993). Rochelle Dreyfuss makes a distinction between competitive lan-
guage which should be restricted under trademark law and expressive language, such as
parody, which should be left unregulated. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trade-
marks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 397, 406-08 (1990). It is
difficult to distinguish between commercial and non-commercial speech just as it is diffi-
cult to distinguish between political and non-political speech.
7 See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988).
Hughes argues that "the greatest difference between the bundles of intellectual property
rights and the bundles of rights over other types of property is that intellectual property
always has a self-defined expiration, a built-in sunset." Id. at 296. This statement is rather
puzzling since trademark doctrine lacks such a restriction. Yet, it is possible to apply this
notion of sunset and non-sunset restrictions to differentiate trademark from other intellec-
tual property regimes.
8 See Wendy Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the
Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009 (1990) (discussing the ability of copy-
right holders to deny access to critics and others); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the
Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HAgv. L. REv. 1661 (1988) (calling for the non-enforcement of fair
use when it conflicts with certain public interests); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright,
and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1987) (arguing that the Constitution's copyright clause
embodies free speech through a notion of public benefit).
The Supreme Court recently asserted the need to recognize an intellectual property
public domain. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151
(1989) ("Free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the protection of a federal
patent is the exception."). Nevertheless, the court's emphasis upon the diffusion of ideas
(rather than symbols) suggests that copyright and patent have more compelling claims for
free exploitation. Id. at 157-60.
9 To the extent that confusion is more difficult to show, the recent amendment to the
Lanham Act, the Federal Dilution Act of 1995, requiring that only commercial use of a
famous mark is actionable under dilution standards, creates some relief for non-commer-
cial users of the mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
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authorial role in associating a symbol with an object. An authorial
model creates competing interests of the public as creator.
A number of legal scholars have proposed alternative models.
These are based either upon a personality theory of property rights
or the rights of the commons within a labor theory-Lockean para-
digm. Connecting ownership with self-constitution or personhood,
the personality theory of property argues that certain objects which
shape the expression of individual identity should be seen as differ-
ent than fungible commodities. Other property rights should be
balanced against this need for self-construction. Trademarks as sta-
tus symbols fall under this analysis.1a
The various forms of Lockean models seek to limit those rights
and privileges of trademark owners that intrude upon the public
right to either a linguistic or cultural commons." Private trade-
mark privileges are constrained in order to prevent harm to the
commons. Here the balancing test is between private rights and
public good. Thus, a major concern is that both the personality
theory and Lockean paradigms begin with the premise that
through sole creation of the trademark, its holder has established
ownership. In the original position, according to these models, all
property rights belong to the trademark holder. It is only second-
in-time concern with the making of individual selves or common
good that legitimizes limiting those rights.
What I want to do here is to posit an alternative model of pub-
lic authorship where private trademark rights are limited from the
very beginning. My model is founded upon both a personality the-
ory and a labor theory for creating intellectual property. But there
is a major point of departure. Even as these other paradigms limit
certain private entitlements they remain highly individualistic: it is
the individual identity at stake in the personality theory and the
first-in-time individual acquisition in the Lockean labor theory.
The public authorship model, however, addresses the question of
collective identity. It is the collective personality of culture that
participates in the authorship of trademarks and that act of collec-
10 See Malla Pollack, Your Image is My Image: Wen Advertising Dedicates Trademarks to the
Public Domain - with an Example from the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 14 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1392 (1993). Pollack argues that lifestyle-centered trademarks should be viewed as
needed for creation of the self. As this essay progresses, I take a Sandelian position that the
self emerges in relationship to the collective. The most articulate exposition of the person-
ality theory is MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 1-71 (1993). Cf William
Joseph Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 614 (1988) (arguing that
reliance upon the owned property of another should create property rights).
11 For a discussion of models proposed by Wendy Gordon and Stephen Carter, see infra
Part III.
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tive labor establishes a stake to trademark symbolism contempora-
neous with any private claims.
This is significant for a number of reasons. First and foremost,
it is significant because it recognizes a too often ignored role of the
public in creating property rights. Despite the mixing of labor
power, proprietary rights of tangible goods such as manufactured
objects are generally assigned to the person who controls the
means of production. In intellectual property, where the stakes are
cultural, it is possible to make a more cogent argument about the
costs of property alienation.
Second, a public authorship model shifts the burden of
claims, away from the public and back to the private enterprise
seeking trademark protection. Under a personality theory of prop-
erty, an individual must demonstrate the personal loss entailed as a
result of deprivation of certain kinds of property. A Lockean labor
model limits ownership only through demonstrable disadvantage
to the commons. Here, however, the public does not have to prove
harm. Instead, it is the trademark holder's proprietary claims that
are limited ab initio because of the public contribution in creating
the mark.
The third reason for a public authorship model is practical.
The model carves out a public stake in all trademarks. Not simply
those marks that are charged with status/personal meaning or
those that might threaten the cultural or linguistic domain, but the
over-all regulation of trademarks by the public is justified as a com-
pelling public purpose. Although according to classical trademark
doctrine public regulation of trademarks varies with the distinctive-
ness of the mark, there is always a core public interest that cannot
be lost.
Part I of this article, "Is there an Author for a Trademark?,"
poses the question of authorship for trademarks. I suggest here
that recent scholarship in literary criticism has redefined author-
ship in ways that are quite relevant to trademark law. It proposes
that readers, as well, may serve as creators. Part II, "Functionalism
and the Lost Public," critiques Frank Schechter's utilitarian and
historicist interpretation of the meaning of trademark. Instead of
Schechter's producer-centered history of trademark, tracing its
evolution from guild marks to the embodiment of marketing good-
will, this section proposes a consumer-centered counter-history. It
shows how the identity of consumer goods originated with palm-
ing-off statutes, but accrued its real importance as mass production
consumer goods became available, and these goods became identi-
1999].
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fled with social distinctions. I argue against recognizing sole pro-
prietary rights for the trademark holder.
Part III, "Locke and the Cultural Commons," returns to the
question of public rights. Here I examine a number of creative
attempts to construct a public entitlement for trademarks based
upon Lockean labor theory. While drawing upon these proposals,
this section offers a richer reading of Locke which takes into ac-
count his linguistic theory of public language-making as well as his
theory legitimizing property rights based upon the creator's contri-
bution of labor. I suggest here that a labor theory argument would
be strengthened by placing public authorship in the original
position.
Part IV, "The Public Role in Trademark Doctrine," examines
how deeply the public role is embedded in traditional trademark
common law doctrine. The central theme of this section will be
authorship through association. Much of the doctrinal landscape
traversed is well known: descriptive and arbitrary marks, secondary
meaning, confusion and dilution, and abandonment through ge-
neric use. By emphasizing the public role in associating meaning
with the mark, however, I unite these disparate doctrinal strands to
weave a coherent understanding of trademark common law.
I. Is THERE AN AUTHOR FOR ATRADEMARK?
The question of trademark authorship has often been ob-
scured through cultural commonplaces. Trademarks are bound to
a commercial context, functional (identifying a product) rather
than primarily creative and condensed rather than an expressive
elaboration of ideas and sensibilities. Just as we imagine authors in
a picturesque caf6 in Saint-Germain rather than among the shops
of Herald Square, such authorship seems an unusual question for
commercial language such as trademarks. Yet a trademark is a
creature of symbolic language. Like any other symbol or text,
trademarks do not simply appear out of whole cloth. They are au-
thored. But what does that mean for a mark rather than a book?
Authorship is not a simple concept for either trademarks or
the literary realm of copyright. Take the debates currently raging
in copyright scholarship. Drawing upon literary theory, a number
of copyright scholars have questioned the very idea of the author.I
2
12 Two seminal essays prompted literary debates about authorship that influenced copy-
right scholars: Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in TEXTUAL STRATEGIES: PERSPECTIVES IN
POST-STRUCTURALIST CRITICISM 141 (Josu6 V. Harari ed., 1979), and Roland Barthes, The
Death of the Author, in IMAGE-Music-TEXT 142 (Stephen Heath ed., 1977). See also Jacques
Derrida, Signature Event Context, I GLYPH 172-97 (1977).
[Vol. 17:1
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Authorship, they argue, is a cultural construction. 3 What makes
an author? Do not some "authors" (even Shakespeare) stitch to-
gether texts from pre-existing plots? Or even borrow characters
and scenes whole cloth from other narratives? Why should certain
kinds of expression, like literary production, be privileged above
other types?
14
Such questions strike at the core of assigning special legal priv-
ileges that restrict the use and distribution of written texts. If au-
thorship is elusive in copyright, however, it is even more so in
trademark. While copyright has its classic image of the literary au-
thor and patent law its notion of an inventor, trademark is estab-
lished simply through commercial use.
Compare the role of authorship in trademark and copyright.
Launching a critique of copyright's doctrinal insistence upon a
central place for the author, Peter Jaszi has traced the rise of this
privileged conception to the eighteenth-century origins of copy-
right doctrine.15 The Romantic movement, especially, asserted ex-
treme claims for understanding individual works as the expression
of an individual self. It created the myth of the author as trans-
13 See PeterJaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship, "41 DUKE
L.J. 455 (1991) [hereinafter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright]; Peter Jaszi, On the Author
Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293
(1992); Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the Work,
68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 725 (1993); Keith Aoki, Adrift in the Intertext: Authorship and Audience
"Recoding" Rights, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 805 (1993);'Martha Woodmansee, On the Author
Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 279 (1992);James Boyle, A Theory
of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleen, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CALIF. L. REv.
1413 (1992) (arguing that copyright protection is often predicated upon a distinction be-
tween public and private information informed by the stereotype of the Romantic author).
See also OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS; ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAW (Brad Sherman & Alain
Strowel eds., 1994) and THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP, TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN
LAw AND LITERATURE (Martha Woodmansee & PeterJaszi, eds., 1994). For a related philo-
sophical inquiry, see Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social
Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841 (1993) (noting that cultural assump-
tions about authorship inform how we think about the legal issues of copying).
Among the historical studies of authorship are Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and
the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the "Author," 17 EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984), and Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket
and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51 (1988); see also MARK ROSE,
AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 1-8 (1993); Carla Hesse, Enlightenment
Epistemology and the Laws of Authorship in Revolutionary France, 1777-1793, 30 REPRESENTA-
TIONS 109 (1990) (tracing the alternative political meanings of authorship in Revolutionary
France, from Ancien Rgime individual creator to Revolutionary actor in a broader project
of public enlightenment); Monroe E. Price & Malla Pollack, The Author in Copyright: Notes
for the Literary Critic, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 703 (1992) (discussing the plasticity of
the notion of authorship in copyright). For a comparative perspective, see DAVID SAUN-
DERS, AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT (1992).
14 See Peter Jaszi, Who Cares Who Wrote "Shakespeare?," 37 AM. U. L. REV. 617 (1988);
James D.A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 625
(1988).
15 SeeJaszi, supra note 14.
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formative genius. Jaszi has argued that such a notion of the author
is a stalking horse for economic interests that dominate intellectual
production at the expense of the public.16
Unlike Jaszi's article Toward a Theory of Copyright, this essay
seeks to resurrect the idea of the author in trademark to carve out
a greater role for the public domain. The idea of authorship
presented here differs considerably from the traditional Romantic
understanding of the author as dominant creative force. Trade-
mark cannot be freighted with mythic notions of authorship in the
same way as a great work of literature or art. As Justice Holmes
remarked, a trademark cannot be compared to Milton's Paradise
Lost. 7 Indeed, the public authorial role in trademark is much
closer to the Court's definition of authorship as enumerated in
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony18 : "he to whom anything owes
its origin ..... Trademark originates from a linguistic partner-
ship of consumer/interpreter as well as producer/writer.
A. Author As Creator
This essay suggests that trademark is less a matter of invention
or design of a sign than the association of a mark with a particular
object. Association occurs in two stages. During the first stage, a
producer associates a sign with an object. It may be placed upon
the object as a label or incorporated into its over-all design. Dur-
ing the second stage, that association is recognized and invested
with meaning by the public as an interpretive community. 2° Fol-
lowing association of the object with the sign there is a third stage
where the object-sign association is contextualized within a broader
cultural context. As will be examined below, the public power of
association plays a pivotal role in a number of trademark doctrines
16 SeeJaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright, supra note 13; ROSE, supra note 13.
17 See Chadwick v. Covell, 23 N.E. 1068, 1069 (Mass. 1890).
18 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
19 Id. at 58. This case still serves as the standard legal definition of authorship. See Feist
Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co, Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (discussing whether
a telephone book is a collection of facts or a copyrightable authored text).
20 By the word "sign," I mean a fundamental element of communication. A sign has
various expressions in trademark law. It may be either linguistic (words as found on a
label) or non-linguistic (pictorial representation or trade-dress). According to the widely
accepted semiotician Ferdinand de Saussure, the sign has two intertwined characteristics:
(1) signifier (the tangible expression of communication) and (2) signified (its conceptual
meaning). See FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 1-12 (W. Baskin
trans., McGraw Hill Book Co. 1974) (1915). I am suggesting an application of these two
ideas to trademark doctrine. The first stage is the creation of a signifier (the making of the
tangible mark itself). The second stage is that of the signified (the investing of the mark
with meaning). I will use these terms from semiotics, sign and signifier, throughout the
essay.
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such as the establishing of secondary meaning.21
Who makes a mark is not an idle question. Intellectual prop-
erty rights are often founded upon a right to the product of one's
own labor that begins with an act of creation. The Lockean notion
that creators should be rewarded with just deserts has been en-
shrined in natural rights arguments for the protection of intellec-
tual property rights against free riders. In the words of Justice
Brandeis, a person or corporation should not "reap where it has
not sown. 22 Ownership of intellectual property commonly rests
upon claims to creation or the transfer of those claims. Regardless
of whether the writings remain locked away in a study drawer, like
those of Kafka, or lack any economic utility whatsoever, intellectual
property rights are linked to authorship.23
This article seeks to redefine the public role in making trade-
marks by drawing upon a dominant insight of post-structuralist cul-
tural theory that interpretation is an act of creation. It uses two
critical approaches: (1) new understandings of the meaning of au-
thorship found in reader-response theory, and (2) new under-
standings of the meaning of consumption and language drawn
largely from the work of Pierre Bourdieu. These approaches see
cultural forms as constructed through interpretive interaction.
Reader-response criticism emphasizes the convergent relationship
between the beholder and the work. It views readers as actualizing
a text and becoming co-producers of that text through interpreta-
tion. The idea of the text encompasses its reception as well as the
language composed by the writer. 24
21 See infra Part IV.
22 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
23 See LAWRENCE BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS '(1977); JER-
EMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988); Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of
Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. REv. 516 (1993); William M. Landes & Richard A. Pos-
ner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987); Robert C. Den-
icola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 516 (1981) (asserting that the collection of information warrants copyright
because of a labor theory of just deserts); TimothyJ. Brennan, Copyright, Property, and the
Right to Deny, 68 CH.-KENT L. REv. 675 (1993).
For an attempt to construct an economic fair use rationale, see WendyJ. Gordon, Fair
Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
24 Reader-response theory developed as a response to the New Criticism idea of the
autonomy of text. See WOLFGANG ISER, THE ACT OF READING 3-52 (1978); WOLFGANG ISER,
PROSPECTING: FROM READER RESPONSE TO LITERARY ANTHROPOLOGY 3-41 (1989); Tzvetan
Todorov, Reading as Construction, in THE READER IN THE TEXT 67 (Susan R. Suleiman &
Inge Crosman, eds., 1980).
Two strands of reader-response theory take a different approach to the question of
reader authorship. Closer to the argument in this article, Wolfgang Iser sees readers as co-
creators. Georges Poulet, on the other hand, suggests a greater distance between reader
and text. He sees the interaction as largely one of two consciousnesses. See Georges
1999]
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Here it will be argued that the public forms an interpretive
community whose reading of trademark symbolism casts it in the
role of creating authorial-like meanings about the mark itself.
Bourdieu situates language within a social context. All language
consists of words and a linguistic market which informs how those
words are defined. For Bourdieu language is contextualized mean-
ing. It is not static nor an idealized dictionary full of words, but a
dynamic exchange of signs, interpretations, and social mimesis,
with its meaning shifting from one context to another.2 5
B. Investing in a Symbol
Authorship in trademark can be redefined to include a public
act of interpretive association precisely because it lacks the idea of
individual authorial/inventive production that lies at the center of
other intellectual property regimes. The Constitution established
federal regulation of patent and copyright "to promote the pro-
gress of science and useful arts by securing ... authors and inven-
tors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries. '26 While acknowledging the practical need to en-
courage investment in literary and scientific expression, this pro-
vocative use of the possessive pronoun implies that copyright and
patent may protect intellectual creations for the sake of the creator
himself.
With its more tenuous connection to authorship, trademark is
not mentioned with patent and copyright. Instead, the Supreme
Court in the Trade-Mark Cases7 ruled that federal power to regulate
trademarks fell solely under the Commerce Clause: "[T]he ordi-
nary trademark has no necessary relation to invention or discov-
ery."'28 In its decision, the Court made a clear distinction between
trademark law and the author-driven doctrines of patent and copy-
right. It held that trademarks are established often as the result of
accident, not of design; that trademarks take root over a considera-
ble period, not as a result of sudden invention; and that they are
Poulet, Criticism and the Experience ofInterioricity, in READER RESPONSE CRITICISM 41 (Jane P.
Tompkins ed., 1980). David Bleich argues that the first step in reader-response is fictional-
ization, the making of an aesthetic object no longer real. See DAVID BLEICH, SUBJECTIVE
CRITICISM 97-133 (1978). A similar phenomenological response may take place when
trademarks as objects are seen as distanced through brands from their utility. Response
theory also applies to images such as art. See DAVID FREEDBERG, THE POWER OF IMAGES:
STUDIES IN THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF RESPONSE 1-26 (1989).
25 See PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 1-36 (John B. Thompson ed.,
Gino Raymond & Matthew Adamson trans. 1991).
26 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
27 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
28 Id. at 94.
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not the "fruits of intellectual labor,"2 unlike copyrights or patents.
This remarkable early admission of the problem of authorship
in trademarks has gone relatively unnoticed. The dilemma comes
from two commonplaces. First, there is the identification of right
to ownership with creativity. How much creativity is enough to war-
rant protection?3" Nobel Prizes are not awarded for trademarks.
Despite Madison Avenue's self-promotion about creative advertis-
ing, no one speaks of a trademark artist. Fabricating symbols
seemed to the Supreme Court in the Trade-Mark Cases as requiring
"no fancy or imagination, or genius"31 and as too simple a task to
"legitimize an entire intellectual property regime."32
The second rights argument justifying intellectual property is
based upon labor. A large expenditure of intellectual labor is not
required to design a label. Here, too, the Trade-Mark Cases Court
seemed skeptical, stating that trademark is "simply founded on pri-
ority of appropriation."33 How much "sweat of the brow" is needed
to establish proprietary rights?34 Taking a natural rights approach,
however, trademark must be justified by some form of labor.
If not intellectual labor, then what kind of labor can serve as the
foundation for proprietary privileges? How can the rights of the
trademark holder be predicated upon investing labor in symbolic
production? The solution has been to shift the notion of labor
investment from the actual sign to the good will embodied by that
sign. Good will is defined as the willingness of a customer to con-
tinue doing business after the first transaction. It is a bit of a semi-
otic shell game: the consumer object is signified by good will
29 Id.
30 Even with copyright, there is a concern that the act of creation be original and in-
dependent enough. SeeJaszi, supra note 14 (noting that Shakespeare's dramas, written
prior to the rise of authorial dominance, are a pastiche of material from other sources and
demonstrate the difficulty of determining originality standards); Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking
Originality, 34 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 801 (1993) (attempting to determine thresholds of
creativity that might warrant protection); Elizabeth H. Wang, (Re)-productive Rights: Copy-
right and the Post-Modern Artist, 14 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 261 (1990) (explaining that the
multiplicity of modern art media often entails reproduction, making it difficult to deter-
mine originality in traditional ways).
31 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.
32 Id.
33 ld.
34 Courts have come to differentiate between creativity and hard work. SeeJane C. Gins-
burg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REv.
1865 (1990) (recognizing the need to protect "high authorship," such as literature, justi-
fied through creativity and "low authorship," such as maps and computer data bases, justi-
fied through labor arguments). Justice O'Connor recently stated that "copyright awards
originality, not effort." Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 364
(1991); see alsoJane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Infor-
mation after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 338 (1992) (arguing that the Feist
decision fails to fulfill the Constitutional mandate promoting the creation of intellectual
property).
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which, in turn, is signified by a trademark."
Is it possible to argue that trademarks are institutional public-
ity rights?36 Just as individuals have the right to control commer-
cial use of their identity so should the identity of products be
protected. Identity for trademark reflects the product itself and
the feelings it generates (i.e., good will). This makes for an impor-
tant distinction between publicity rights and trademarks. Publicity
rights depend upon the identification of the persona. A celebrity
expends considerable efforts to make his or her self distinct. Elton
John wears peculiar glasses, Madonna can often be found in linge-
rie. No prior commercial exploitation of that self is necessary.
Good will, however, depends upon the reputation of a product
with consumers in a commercial setting. It requires consumer con-
sciousness. This explains why there is a confusion rationale for
trademarks but not for publicity. Good will is an identification cre-
ated by the public.3
But is good will authored in the same way as more tangible
symbols? The classic understanding of good will is as reputation.
While trademark serves as the marker for how a potential con-
sumer might identify a product, the good will itself is seen as
emerging from care in maintaining quality and marketing. The
next section traces the emergence of a modern doctrine of good
will. It examines the seminal trademark theory of Frank Schechter
who transformed good will from consumer evaluation of quality
into brand attachment generated through mass marketing.
Ii. FUNCTIONALISM AND THE LOST PUBLIC
No work has been more influential in shaping the lenses
15 SeeJ. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.7-2.10 (2d ed.
1984).
36 See Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandising of
Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV. 603 (1984) (suggesting that the confusion rationale
provides insufficient protection for corporate logos and that there should be a right analo-
gous to a publicity right for these symbols); Pollack, supra note 10 (arguing that symbols
serving as markers for lifestyles should receive less protection).
37 See McCARTHY, supra note 35, § 28.01-28.02; Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of
Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691 (1986) (referring to
reputation as property because it reflects exertion of labor or talent to create self).
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), an analogy is made to the
goals of patent and copyright that protects creative labor. Interestingly, the Supreme
Court does not make a comparison to trademarks where, as discussed above, it is more
difficult to make an argument founded upon notions of creative labor, Yet, publicity rights
are also very much a creature of legal making. See JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE:
THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE LAw 1-41 (1991); Michael Madow, Private Ownership and
Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 125, 147-81 (1993) (illus-
trating how Melville Nimmer, who frequently represented Hollywood interests, worked to
create a tort distinct from a privacy tort).
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through which we examine trademark doctrine than that of Frank
Schechter. Prior to his two works, the pathbreaking 1926 article,
The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection,38 and a 1925 book entitled
Historical Foundations of Trade-Mark Law,39 trademark common law
rarely addressed broader questions of purpose.4 ° Moreover,
Schechter's thinking was embodied in the codification of trade-
mark doctrine in the Lanham Act. In this section I will examine
Schechter's functionalist and historical claims at some length, ad-
dressing each in turn. I will also argue that Schechter's notion of
trademark has been critical in establishing the idea of the public as
a distant and disenfranchised entity.
A. Functional Denial of the Public Role
Schechter began by rejecting the earlier orthodoxy of trade-
mark as a means of identifying the source of a product.41 He ar-
gued that it does not matter whether cocoa comes from one
manufacturer or another.4 2 Do consumers really care? Are they
familiar with different manufacturing processes? What is signifi-
cant is that the trademark, the sign affixed to goods serves as a
promise of a certain quality. Schechter disassociated trademark
from the sphere of production and reassociated it with consump-
tion. More will be said about this intellectual shift when discussing
Schechter's historical argument.
4 3
This step was critical for the most daring part of Schechter's
argument, that "the trademark is not merely the symbol of good
will but often the most effective agent for the creation of good will,
imprinting upon the public mind an anonymous and impersonal
guaranty of satisfaction, creating a desire for further satisfac-
38 See supra note 1.
39 FRANK L. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-
MARKS (1925).
40 See Schechter, supra note 1, at 813-33; Elizabeth Cutter Bannon, Revisiting "The Ra-
tional Basis of Trademark Protection," 24 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 65 (1990); SCHECHTER, supra
note 39. Schechter's task, as he saw it, was to update the trademark doctrine to create
stronger protection at a time of expanding commerce and broad national markets. Look-
ing beyond reliance on traditional common law of trademarks, he sought federal legisla-
tion that would embody common law notions with Schechter's own readings of the
purposes behind those notions. See Schechter, Fog and Fiction in Trade-Mark Protection, 36
COLUM. L. REv. 60 (1936). Schechter is also seen as the father of dilution doctrine in
trademark, identifying the injury that would result from the unauthorized use of an estab-
lished mark to identify non-competing goods. Elliot B. Staffin, The Dilution Doctrine: To-
wards a Reconciliation with the Lanham Act, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105,
108 (1995).
41 See Schechter, supra note 1, at 814
42 Id. at 813-33.
43 See infra Part II.B.
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tions."44 The transformation is striking. No longer a passive
marker of origins, trademark becomes a kind of motor that sets
into motion latent consumer demand. It is a magical invocation
that conjures up tempting images, desires, and consumer fantasies.
In traditional trademark doctrine, good will emerged only from re-
peat transactions. For Schechter, however, good will might be ac-
tively created through marketing.
Not too much imagination is needed to see that fueling
Schechter's essay was a Keynesian paradigm for stimulating stag-
nant markets. 45 Product differentiation elicits consumer desire
and therefore increases purchasing, making the economy stronger.
The purpose of trademark, in short, was to help generate longing
for more consumer goods. In Schechter's words, "the mark actu-
ally sells the goods."4 6 Behind this model lies a utilitarian ration-
ale. Commercial regulation of trademarks maximizes the good
through encouraging quality products, decreases consumer search
costs, and (significantly for Schechter) reinvigorates the macro-
economy.
The public would benefit. At the same time, however, the
public was seen as largely one-dimensional and passive, subject to
shrewd attempts to shape its consciousness. Schechter assumed a
model of consumer manipulation. At the time when Schechter was
writing and Madison Avenue was just beginning to shape the tastes
of a consuming public, such a straight-forward model of consumer
response must have been more compelling. It continues to have
immense influence on trademark doctrine. Yet in light of contem-
porary cultural studies, Schechter's functionalism seems remarka-
bly impoverished. Two arguments undercut his model: (1)
Schechter ignored the cultural function of trademarks that extends
beyond their economic value, and (2) this cultural function is de-
fined through a complex field of public symbolic readings and not
simply through marketing.
1. Cultural Functionalism and Territories of the Self
Schechter distinguishes between producer and consumer in
The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection.4 7 The producer or mar-
keter is a rational maximizer of private gain (and, as a conse-
44 Schechter, supra note 1, at 819.
45 Around 1930, shortly after the publication of Schechter's Rational Basis, other func-
tional interpretations emerged. See Nathan Isaacs, Traffic in Trade Symbols, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1210 (1931), and Grover C. Grismore, The Assignment of Trade-Marks and Trade Names, 30
MICH. L. REV. 489 (1932).
46 Schechter, supra note 1, at 819.
47 Id.
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quence, public good) who employs rational marketing strategies.
Conversely, Schechter defines inclinations as irrational. The con-
sumer is full of fanciful tastes and acts according to whims gener-
ated through clever marketing. Why, after all, should consumers
prefer blue jeans of one brand over another of equal quality? Why
drive a Mercedes when a Chevrolet might provide just as adequate
transportation?48
Schechter's argument favors trademark holders by privileging
them for their rationality. Yet, are consumers really irrational?
The seemingly irrational, arbitrary, and simply responsive choices
of consumers are just the opposite.49 Purchasers carefully choose
material goods to construct an outward expression of identity. Just
as producers charge a symbol with meaning through advertising,
consumers invest social or cultural capital. In the evocative phrase
of Irving Goffman, consumers make possible "territories of the
self."'50 Schechter's functionalism is too limited because it fails to
take into account the way trademarks themselves act as cultural
signs. The style of the object as well as the mark identifies the user.
A consumer might declare herself the kind of person who wears
Polo horn-rimmed glasses (rather than any other sort) and affects
the particular Anglophilia of Ralph Lauren tweed. Alternatively, a
consumer might opt for a more American, more macho persona,
wearing Stetson hats and smoking Marlboros. Identification with a
particular trademark is intimately bound with self-constitution.
Moreover, individuals invest marks with meaning far beyond
what is assigned by marketers. Take granola, for example. A gra-
nola manufacturer might market its product as natural or healthy.
Consumers, on the other hand, borrow the corporate symbol of
this granola and use it to identify themselves as proponents of a
simple life. The trademark then cascades with a host of other sym-
bols such as Birkenstock sandals, Thoreau, Vermont woods, vegeta-
rianism, Walt Whitman, and Shaker furniture.
This seems to point towards a possible personality theory of
property argument. Consumer proprietary rights are based upon
the close attachment of consumer identity with trademarks. But
such claims would be weakened by the fact that there is already
ample access within markets to the cultural symbols embodied by
48 For a major critique of the manipulative model, see MARY DOUGLAS & BARON ISHER-
WOOD, THE WORLD OF GOODS: TOWARDS AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONSUMPTION 15-24, 56-70
(1978).
49 SeeJOHN O'SHAUGHNESSY, WHY PEOPLE Buy 79-97 (1987); DAVID PEARS, MOTIVATED
IRRATIONALITY 2-16 (1984).
50 ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 28-61
(1971).
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material goods. For example, if personal identity is already at-
tached to Chanel No.5, designer clothes, or a certain type of auto-
mobile, then all the consumer has to do is purchase the item. It is
also difficult to untangle circular arguments about consumer ma-
nipulation and consumer autonomy. Does a buyer purchase a shirt
with a prominent L.L. Bean logo because advertising has commu-
nicated that this speaks of rural independence or because as a
Maine-sort-of-person there is a need to borrow the commercial ex-
pressions of that lifestyle? Or, does the purchase occur for both
reasons?
2. Collective Meaning of Symbols
Personality theory must be mixed with a labor theory of prop-
erty. The public, marketers, and any denizens of the contemporary
cultural landscape dwell in a world that has been collectively cre-
ated. Here, again, the work of Pierre Bourdieu is important.
Bourdieu views consumer choice as taking place within a field of
cultural norms. The purchasing of goods is an attempt to place
oneself within that field. In his classic work, Distinction,5 Bourdieu
shows how consumers make choices constrained by social norms
that suggest what is appropriate for their status and social position.
Marketing simply avails itself of these pre-existing social categories.
The collective investment in creating these cultural and social
categories is immense. Limiting his view to economic investment,
Schechter fails to take into account the cultural investment of a
symbol with meaning. This economic focus explains his primary
concern with protecting the trademark holder's investment. For
Schechter, the crux of trademark protection is anti-dilution.
Dilution as a potential harm is defined as "the gradual whit-
tling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public
mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing
goods. ' 52 Here again, the public mind is critical but the public
right is minimal. Even though Elm City Beer only refers to a kind
of ale, for example, its mark would be protected against use identi-
fying other goods such as packaged nuts or pretzels. It does not
matter whether the public is mistaken about the business relation-
ship between the beer and the snack food.
Instead, anti-dilution protection is a kind of boundary tend-
ing, cordoning off use of alternative names and symbols by other
51 PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SoctAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE 2-43
(Richard Nice trans. 1984).
52 Schechter, supra note 1, at 825.
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goods in order to avoid competing images or symbols gaining ac-
cess to consumer consciousness. Trademark holders are the pri-
mary beneficiaries of dilution doctrine. However, there are other
concerns that trademarks might be seen as protecting such fraud.
Schechter makes a claim for stronger protection of property rights
in trademarks by focusing on the cause for relief rather than the
deception of the public. Schechter seeks to protect a producer's
good will investment from infringement. The producer standard-
izes production, invests in advertising, and targets certain markets.
No question exists today about the magnitude of this labor-capital
investment. Vast resources are expended on advertising alone.
Nike, for example, has spent close to three hundred million dollars
on advertising." The image is one of hardscrabble merchandising
at best, manipulation of consumers at worst. As Justice Frankfurter
wrote, the holder of a trademark exploits the psychological func-
tion of symbols by "making every human effort to impregnate the
,atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial
symbol. 54
Not only do marketers invest in trademarks, but consumers
make a considerable investment as well. They invest psychological
meaning, as seen in the significant sales of goods emblazoned with
the old-fashioned Coca-Cola mark, and they often invest additional
capital by consciously choosing to purchase a specific brand rather
than another. In fact, their affirmative purchasing of goods subsi-
dizes the advertising costs invested by marketers. If trademarks en-
sure product differentiation, sustain quality, create a usable short-
hand to lower consumer search costs, or help stimulate the econ-
omy, it is the consumer who pays dearly for these benefits through
his or her pocketbook.55
Finally, Schechter's Rational Basis implicitly assumes that in-
vestment should be rewarded. Yet many other kinds of investments
(like those in innovative machinery, untried technology, or a new
53 See Nike, Inc. v. 'Just Did It" Enterprises, 6 F.3d 1225, 1225-28 (7th Cir. 1993). For a
discussion of Nike, see infta, notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
54 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
55 Law and economics analysis has been used largely to legitimate trademark holders'
economic advantage. See Landes & Posner, supra note 23 (asserting that the use of trade-
marks contributes to wealth-maximization through promoting economic efficiency
through diminishing search costs and stimulating quality production).
A number of scholars have shed doubt on the economic advantages of intellectual
property regimes. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protec-
tion of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948) (arguing that the reputation of goods, not
advertising value, is in the public interest); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A
Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L. REV. 281 (1970)
(disputing the economic advantages of copyright exclusion); Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L.
Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE LJ. 1323 (1980).
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physical location) lack any sort of protective privileges. Invest-
ments are often more important for generating economic value.
Why should investments in good will be singled out for reward with
a grant of monopolistic rights over the use of a particular symbol?
Trademarks might even erect unnatural barriers to market entry by
other products at a cost to the economy as a whole. Schechter's
tilting of protection in favor of private property interests represents
more than the inability to recognize a more robust public role. It
emerges from a larger failure to see trademark as anything more
than a one-dimensional economic actor.
B. Historical Denial of the Public Role
The public has fared no better through Schechter's investiga-
tion of trademark legal history. According to Schechter, trade-
marks underwent a transformation from a guild mark indicating
origins to a functional symbol representing the quality of a prod-
uct.5 6 Schechter argued that when trademarks ceased to be com-
pulsory guild symbols in the early modern period, they became
commercial assets in their own rights.57 This tale, then, is about
the rise of trademarks as property. Producers saw trademarks first
as exclusive patents from. the Crown, later as property. Schechter
fails, however, to address the public's historical role in shaping the
creation of these symbols.58
Just as PeterJaszi has mined the legal history of copyright,59 it
is necessary to construct a revisionist historical understanding of
trademark. Jaszi argues that the Romantic movement fabricated a
new notion of the author as a larger than life literary figure.6"
Here it will be argued that Romanticism was critical for construct-
ing a public authorial stake in trademark. *A seminal recent book,
Colin Campbell's The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Con-
sumerism,61 links mass consumption with the Romantic movement's
search for individual expression. Romanticism emphasized the de-
velopment of sensibilities through objects of art and the self-con-
scious awareness of the magnetic power (sometimes attractive,
56 See generally, Schechter, supra note 1, at 813-15. For a recent discussion of trademarks
prior to the Industrial Revolution, see Keith M. Stolte, How Early Did Anglo American Trade-
mark Law Begin? An Answer to Schechter's Conundrum, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 505 (1993).
57 Id. at 815-19.
514 See SCHECHiTER, supra note 39, at 3-18, 78-79.
59 SeeJaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright, supra note 13.
60 See id at 455.
61 COLIN CAMPBELL, THE ROMANTIC ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF MODERN CONSUMERISM
(1987).
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sometimes repulsive) of a world of clearly differentiated goods. 62
The Romantic Movement was a critical component in the crea-
tion of authorship for copyright. The movement also played an
important role in making mass consumer culture, with all its autho-
rial implications for trademarks. The widening variety of available
consumer goods were used to craft an outer presentation of the
self. Schechter traces the emergence of trademark from a signifier
of an object's origins to its identity as property. The historical pres-
entation below suggests a counter-narrative that reverses
Schechter's approach by arguing that trademarks began as prop-
erty. During the age of mass consumption, however, they became a
form of expressive language.
1. Signs Emerge from Historical Context
Peter Jaszi points to the ways texts were constructed from sur-
roundings.63 In a similar fashion, an historical revision of trade-
mark legal history would discuss the context of the market culture
that served as a milieu shaping the relationship between trade-
marks and the public. Schechter does the opposite. He sees trade-
mark as a sign affixed to an object rather than as a dynamic
language emerging in the midst of market exchanges.
This literalist association of sign with trademark is the reason
Schechter begins his genealogy of trademarks with guild marks. It
is an unfortunate choice for his argument. The guild mark was
most certainly seen as a property asset. It did not signify the iden-
tity of the object for the benefit of consumers as much as it served
as a patent granted for the sake of producers. Similar to
Schechter's depiction of modern trademark as non-physical prop-
erty rights, guild marks represented a bundle of rights against
others.
The right to exclusive production was valued rather than the
symbol itself. Since only certain guilds were allowed to make cer-
tain products, competition for these monopoly privileges was stiff.
For example, when umbrellas came to France toward the end of
the seventeenth-century, the wooden comb guild (which pointed
to the handle) and the fan guild (which pointed to the fabric) bat-
tled for a state patent. The guild mark was most certainly a sought
after species of property. The purpose of guild marks was to im-
pede free competition.64
62 Id.
63 SeeJaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright, supra note 13, at 456.
64 A standard account of the history of trademark law can be found in McCARTHY, supra
note 35, § 5.1. See also SCHECHTER, supra note 39; WILLIAm H. SEWELL, JR., WORK AND
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A guild mark shares some troubling similarities with
Schechter's notion of functional trademarks. It was protected to
benefit the producer, created differentiated markets, and estab-
lished a monopoly (if not over symbolic expression) at least over
production. Nor was Schechter correct that the guild mark served
to identify the origins of goods. There was no reason to do so. For
the most part, transactions were face-to-face. Personal attestations
made by sellers served as a mark for the object. Moreover, all ob-
jects of a certain sort were either produced by a specific guild or
imported. Counter to Schechter's portrait, the guild mark ensured
quality through self-regulation. Each trade community had inspec-
tors who examined products to ensure that they met certain stan-
dards.65 If not, they might be destroyed on the spot. Sumptuary
laws and a culture of status-based consumption limited the extent
to which guild marks might entice consumers.
The problem is not that Schechter was an inaccurate historian.
Historical research was not, after all, his area of expertise. What is
important is that Schechter's identification of trademarks with
guild marks, and his notion of their ultimate transformation into a
species of property, invests producers with an historical justifica-
tion for a private entitlement to trademarks. Indeed, it would have
been possible for Schechter to tell a different story, one that began
with the rise of unfair competition doctrine in the mid nineteenth
century. The centerpiece of this counter-narrative would have
been the consuming public.
With the exception of a tort for the fraudulent palming off of
goods as those of another, little trademark doctrine developed un-
til the middle of the nineteenth century. Its real emergence came
as the Industrial Revolution increased access to commodities. In
1844, Justice Story granted the first injunction for trademark in-
fringement.66 Congress did not pass its first trademark statute
seeking to regulate registration protected under common law until
the 1870s.6 7 The Supreme Court grappled with its constitutional
basis in the Trade-Mark Cases.6" England followed a similar chronol-
ogy, formalizing trademark by statute during the 1880s.69 In the
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE: THE LANGUAGE OF LABOR FROM THE OLD REGIME TO 1848 2-37
(1980).
65 In France, these inspectors were called jures.
66 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 226-27 (1973).
67 An Act to Revise, Consolidate and Amend the Statutes Relating to Patents and Copy-
rights, Ch. 2, §§77-84, 16 Stat. 198 (1870).
68 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
69 See Patents, Designs, and Trademarks Act, 46 & 47 Vict, c.57 (1883); Merchandise
Marks Act, 50 & 51 Vict, c.28 (1887).
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case of both England and America, however, these statutes sought
largely to prevent fraud against the public.
Schechter's decision to embark upon trademark history with
guild marks as his starting point rather than unfair competition
demonstrates a view of trademarks that favors producers. Trade-
mark history is conflictual. There are two competing interpretive
strands: (1) trademark as protecting producer property rights
(Schechter's appeal to guild mark origins) against trademark as
protecting consumers from fraud (unfair competition laws), and
(2) trademark as expression of product for the purpose of market-
ing (Schechter's functionalism) against trademark as expression of
consumer's cultural attachment to product (cultural critique as de-
veloped below). The first halves of these equations emphasize pro-
ducer rights, the second halves focus upon consumer interests.
Schechter, and the prevailing commonplace legal theory, have fa-
vored producers because they have failed to reevaluate the cultural
role of trademarks. In the next section, it will be argued that the
rise of a mass culture of consumption created new consumer-cen-
tered meanings for trademarks.7 °
2. Birth of a Consumer Society
Historians speak of the birth of a consumer society in late
eighteenth-century England. This transformation was sparked by
the commercialization of fashion in the form of development of
shop windows, rapid obsolescence of styles, emphasis upon novelty
and an explosion of available consumer goods. Josiah Wedgewood
pioneered product differentiation with china patterns targeted for
different segmented markets. For the patriotic middle class,
Wedgewood had scenes of Chatham dying and Wesley preaching.
Through royal patronage, however, he also appealed to consump-
tion that mimicked aristocratic tastes. England's new commercial
activity was still largely based upon small workshops. Yet consum-
ers animated much of England's shift to economies of scale. Sus-
tained with profits from trade, a growing middle class demanded
more and more consumer goods. New tastes and preferences were
developed that could only be met by mass production."
70 See McCARTHY, supra note 35, § 2.7-2.10; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989) (stating that historical origins of trademark doctrine consti-
tutes common law fraud, and "while that may result in the creation of 'quasi-property
rights' in communicative symbols, the focus is on the protection of consumers, not the
protection of producers as an incentive to product innovation.").
71 See NEIL McKENDRICK ET AL., THE BIRTH OF CONSUMER SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CEN-
TURY ENGLAND 1-196 (1982); GRANT MCCRACKEN, CULTURE AND CONSUMPTION: NEW AP-
PROACHES TO THE SYMBOLIC CHARACTER OF CONSUMER GOODS AND ACTrIVITIES 3-30 (1988);
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By the middle of the nineteenth-century, large scale manufac-
turing of consumer goods set into motion a second consumer
revolution, a culture of mass consumption. Trademarks were en-
meshed in the emergence of this fully elaborated culture of mass
consumption in the late nineteenth-century that stretched from
the Bonmarch6 to the conspicuous consumption of the Gilded
Age. The hallmarks of mass consumption included international
exhibitions and fairs, industrial design and the rise of professional
advertising. But the most striking development in this period was
the advent of department stores.72 Filled with consumer norms of
a growing bourgeoisie, department stores reproduced aristocratic
conceptions of luxury while reflecting distinctly middle-class no-
tions of domesticity. However, making goods widely available
threatened to erode the social distinctions created through differ-
ent patterns of consumption. The division of products into a vari-
ety of different kinds, made still more differentiated through
trademark, allowed the reestablishment of status-based distinction.
The culture of mass consumption represented by department
stores also served as the centerpiece of a new consumer mentality
where consumer choice served as a primary means of establishing
individual identity. In his classic theory of conspicuous consump-
tion, Thorstein Veblen attributes a good deal of purchasing to
imitation or emulation 73 . However, Veblen's conception overem-
phasizes the role of consumption in signaling status. It fails to ap-
preciate the ways that consumption constructs identity in a variety
of more complex ways. This identity construction is placed within
a broad field of cultural forms.
With this new found emphasis upon consumption as expres-
sion, trademarks took on an increased significance paralleling the
rise of mass consumer markets. In England and America, the Mor-
risonian Arts and Crafts movement as well as a backward-looking
aristocratic intellectual movement, represented by such figures as
William M. Reddy, The Structure of a Cultural Crisis: Thinking about Cloth in France Before and
After the Revolution, in THE SOCIAL LIFE AS THINGS: COMMODITIES IN CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES
261 (Arjun Appadurai, ed. 1986) (tracing the difficult passage from guild produced cloth
to commodity).
72 SeeJEAN-CHRISTOPHE AGNEW, COMING UP FOR AIR: CONSUMER CULTURE IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE (John Brewer & Roy Porter, eds., 1993); William R. Leach, Transformation in a
Culture of Consumption: Women and Department Stores 1890-1925, 74 J. Am. HIST. 71 (1984);
MICHAEL B. MILLER, THE BON MARCH: BOURGEOIS CULTURE AND THE DEPARTMENT STORE
1869-1920 (1981); SIMON J. BONNER, CONSUMING VISIONS: ACCUMULATION AND THE DISPLAY
OF GOODS IN AMERICA 1880-1920 (1989); SUSAN STRASSER, SATISFACTION GUARANTEED: THE
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN MASS MARKET (1989); ROBERT W. RYDELL, WORLD OF FAIRS: THE
CENTURY OF PROGRESS EXPOSITIONS (1993).
73 THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS: AN ECONOMIC STUDY ON INSTI-
TUTIONS (Penguin USA 1994) (1899).
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Henry Adams, Henry James, and William Dean Howells, demon-
strated an ambivalent relationship to mass consumption."4 But
many citizens of this new consumer society chose not to repudiate
mass-produced goods. A broader response was to personalize ma-
terial goods themselves. For example, Victorians identified them-
selves with a certain kind of fountain pen or a set of leatherbound
copies of Trollope.
An analogy is often made between trademark privileges and
publicity rights. The trademark creates publicity for an object.
Taking this one step further, the trademark itself (especially in cer-
tain circumstances where goods are more personal or serve cul-
tural functions as symbols) becomes the marker not just for an
object but for other things as well, such as an individual consumer
and a variety of cultural meanings that the mark might represent.
Birkenstock might be the trademark for both an individual and a
pair of sandals. Both, in a sense, bear the same symbol. What this
means is that trademark is further disentangled from production.
In a more impersonal and anonymous world, trademark recreated
a personalized connection. But the connection in a full-fledged
consumer society is to the object. Marx called this disassociation
between production and consumption (and the consequential de-
piction of commodities as having their own meaning independent
of their physical nature) "commodity fetishism." 75
The world of consumers has often been portrayed as individ-
ual, as individual choice and individual presentation of the self
(where people pride themselves on their uniqueness and their dif-
ference from others). It evokes images that place individuals
within different categories of class, status, or sensibility. But many
of the choices made by individuals reflect broader cultural prefer-
ences. Middle-class Englishmen might prefer one set of goods, up-
per-class another. These cultural distinctions created the sphere in
which consumption took place. Despite the individual choices
made by buyers, a collective definition of consumers emerged dur-
ing the nineteenth century.
74 See E.P. THOMPSON, WILLIAM MORRIS: ROMANTIC TO REVOLUTIONARY 1-21 (1955); T.J.
JACKSON LARs, No PLACE OF GRACE: ANTIMODERNISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERI-
CAN CULTURE 1880-1920 261-298 (1981);JEAN-CHRISTOPHE AGNEW, THE CONSUMING VISION
OF HENRY JAMES 64-100 (Richard Wrightman & T.J. Jackson Lears eds., 1980); Ross Pos-
NOCK, THE TRIAL OF CURIOSITY- HENRYJAMES, WILLIAM JAMES, AND THE CHALLENGE OF MO-
DERNITY 27-53 (1991); DAVID E. SHI, THE SIMPLE LIFE: PLAIN THINKING AND HIGH LIVING IN
AMERICAN CULTURE (1985).
75 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Frederick Engels ed., Sa-
muel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., The Modern Library 1936) (1867); see SIDNEY W.
MINTz, SWEETNESS AND POWER: THE PLACE OF SUGAR IN MODERN HISTORY 3-150 (1985)
(studying the disassociation between consumption and production).
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Narrow Schechterian notions of functionalism lost sight of the
cultural construction of consumer objects by grafting utilitarian
conceptions of public benefit onto the dominant nineteenth-cen-
tury legal ideal of individual ownership. Not surprisingly, then,
public benefit pales in comparison to tangible private property
rights. The public inhabits only a shadowy place in Schechter's
paradigm.
III. LocKE AND THE CULTURAL COMMONS
The success of Schechter's functionalism did not bode well for
the public domain. In response, a number of imaginative scholars
have taken a natural rights path that leads back to John Locke. In
many ways, Locke is the natural starting point for a discussion of
property rights. His Two Treatises of Government76 have informed vir-
tually every philosophical consideration of ownership. Both the
Constitution and courts drew upon it as a source demonstrating
the legitimacy of proprietary rights.77 Using Locke to carve out
public entitlement, however, has its risks because it has been seen
as a manual for individual acquisition. In C.B. MacPherson's clas-
sic portrait, Locke legitimized the private proprietary instinct that
served as the basis for early modern capitalism.78 But Locke also
may be read for the limits placed upon the appropriation of prop-
erty. It should be recalled that at the center of Locke's philosophi-
cal landscape stood a commons.
Briefly stated, Locke's theory of property is described as life,
liberty, and estates.79 It includes not only real property but owner-
ship of rights as well. This is especially important for more intangi-
ble forms of intellectual property. Most discussions of Lockean
property theory have retained real property as the sole model. But
76 SeeJOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (1690).
77 SeeJohn Dunn, The Politics of Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth Century, in
JOHN LOCKE: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 45(John Yolton ed., 1969) (arguing against the
influence of Locke on American Revolutionary thought). But see SHANON C. STIMSON, THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN MAR-
SHALL 40-48 (1990) (reaffirming the significance of Locke).
78 See C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES
TO LOCKE 194-97 (1962). James Tully has presented a collectivist Locke as opposed to
Macpherson's possessive individual. Pointing to the absence of private property in a state
of nature, Tully argues that private property exists only in a civil society and can therefore
be redistributed for the public good. See JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN
LOCKE AND His ADVERSARIES (1980).
79 See JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, ch. 9, § 123, in LOCKE, supra note
76. This broad definition of rights has been the source of some controversy. Compare
EDWARD ANDREW, SHYLOCK'S RIGHTS: A GRAMMAR OF LOCKIAN CLAIMS 3-24 (1988) (defining
rights as permission, not as moral direction), with A. JOHN SIMMONS, A LOCKEAN THEORY OF
RIGHTS 3-101 (1992) (defining rights as a whole theory of moral determination that shapes
politics and economics).
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intellectual property, trademarks in particular, is different. Two ar-
guments will be made about that difference. First, intellectual
property has a special relationship to a collective cultural construc-
tion of the self. Second, it will be shown that intellectual property
is a creature of civil society and that different rules apply to a com-
mons in civil society than in a state of nature.
Every individual begins with a property right in that person's
body. In Locke's original position, a state of nature, all other prop-
erty is held in common. Locke's reading of this earliest condition
is driven by a theological conception of a property transfer from
God to humankind in common. No person or property is subject
to the arbitrary power of any other individual. But God also be-
queaths a reason to exploit the commons for individual gain.
Since idleness is a sin, people have an affirmative duty to work at
their property, satisfying basic needs for themselves and others.80
The commons is meant to provide sustenance for everyone. There
is a limit to how much man can enjoy this world in a natural state.
Common land cannot be fully exploited. Therefore Locke sug-
gests that private acquisition of property allows persons to improve
property, increasing its value. In the earliest stages of appropria-
tion there is a limit as to how much can be privatized: "As much
Land as a Man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the
Product of, so much is his Property."'" The rise of a monetary sys-
tem ("a little piece of yellow Metal, which would keep without wasting
or decay"),82 however, enlarges the amount of land that might be
appropriated for the benefit of both the possessor and society as a
whole. Appropriating land "increase [s] the common stock of man-
kind," through yielding more produce than uncultivated common
land.83 But private acquisition should neither cause harm by tak-
ing away the sustenance of others nor lead to waste.84
Acquisition takes place through mixing labor with property.
By gathering acorns, according to Locke's well-known image, labor
80 LOCKE, supra note 79, ch. 5, §§ 26-34. God gave the world for "the use of the Indus-
trious and Rational (and Labourwas to be his Title to it) not to the Fancy or Covetousness of
the Quarrelsome and Contentious." Id. § 34. See also Dunn, supra note 77, at 1-15; THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN LOCKE: AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE
"Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT" (1982) (discussing Two Treatises as a theological work
with intellectual underpinnings rooted in the Protestant ideal of a calling); SIMMONS, supra
note 79, at 222-251 (stating that Locke's philosophy of rights emerges from a creative mix
of religious and secular purposes).
81 LocKE, supra note 79, ch. 5, § 32.
82 Id. § 37.
83 Id.
84 Id.
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and object converge to permit appropriation.85 In the classic Lock-
ean state of nature (though later it will be shown that this is not
always the case) it does not require the consent of others to appro-
priate property from the uncultivated portion of the commons.
Appropriation can occur through any number of actions such as
gathering, tilling, or eating. These are what Robert Nozick calls
historical entitlements, based on what people have done.86 It is
unclear, however, how much needs to be done. What amount of
labor is needed to be intermixed in order to make an object one's
own? Why should adding labor, to pose the question used in the
earlier section for trademarks, fence off part of the commons with-
out the consent of others?
A. Provisions for the Second-in-Time Public
Other theories for creating public trademark entitlements in a
Lockean framework have assumed a state-of-nature commons.
This commons is cultural or linguistic. In the beginning, the intan-
gible cultural commons is freely available to all its members until
one chooses to exploit a particular word or symbol. That person
fences off the symbol restricting access to others. No limitations
are placed upon the right of individuals to fence. The question for
these alternative arguments is how to protect the second-in-time
demands for public entitlement so that access can be restored.
Wendy Gordon and Stephen Carter have pressed for public
concerns based upon the important provision established by Locke
that private possession should not cause harm to others. Private
rights are trumped by Locke's imposed duty that goods must be
left in common when an unjustified or wrongful harm is caused by
removing them. Wendy Gordon uses this provision to argue that
trademark's exclusion of others from access to a cultural commons
may cause harm. Take, for example, the use of a mark for pur-
poses of satire or cultural reference. If such borrowing were disal-
lowed based upon a dilution rationale, there would be a loss of
expressive power. Individuals need culture as they need produce
for physical sustenance. The "no-harm principle" creates an enti-
tlement to this cultural commons.87
85 Id. at ch. 9, § 123.
86 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 153-155 (1974); see a/SOJEREMY WAL-
DRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 138 (1988).
87 See WendyJ. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Property, 102 YALE LJ. 1533, 1537 (1993). It is unclear whether the original
appropriation is illegitimate if enough is not left for others. SeeJeremy Waldron, Enough
and as Good Left for Others, 29 PHIL. QUART. 319 (1979). A recent dissent has suggested the
application of Professor Gordon's theory of harm through restricting forms of expression.
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Not overtly Lockean but nevertheless sharing the intellectual
contours of the Second Treatise, Stephen Carter has critiqued the
idea that trademarks are created without cost to consumers. 88 He
argues that there are a limited number of appropriate names for
any product.89 If a producer should make a common phrase, such
as "sparkling" for mineral water, into a trademark, then there
would be an impoverishment of market language to describe other
products.9 ° Carter points to the shrinking pool of language left for
other market entrants to use.91
Both Gordon and Carter have envisioned a cultural or sym-
bolic commons. And both use a notion of harm to generate public
entitlement. But, both arguments assume that the trademark is
created by its holder and that only its harm to the commons is
problematic. The difficulty with such an approach is that it places
the public in a second-in-time role. Against the accepted process
of private acquisition, Gordon and Carter must argue for public
entitlement predicated upon a harm to an individual. Here lies
the tragedy of the cultural commons. What happens when the
harm to the cultural commons is one that injures many people (or
perhaps the commons itself) but not enough to undertake the cost
of making a claim against private exclusive power over a
trademark?
Suppose a manufacturer of cigarettes has a slogan "I'd rather
fight than switch." In the midst of a labor dispute over reporting
production failures of fellow employees, a number of non-union-
ized workers start sporting buttons that read "I'd rather fight than
snitch." Following traditional limits on trademark dilution, the to-
bacco company might win an injunction against use of the slogan.
Gordon's no-harm proviso would allow the protesting employees
access to this part of their cultural fabric. But a small band of work-
ers would not be able to match the legal resources of a major cor-
poration. Moreover, they probably would not be willing to battle
for a slogan that would become irrelevant when the labor dispute
ended.
Or take the actual case of a chicken restaurant which used the
advertising slogan "only a breast in the mouth is better than a leg
in the hand."92 This phrase is clearly a double entendre referring
See White v. Samsung Elec. of Am, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
88 See Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble With Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 759 (1990).
89 Id. at 781.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Brombergv. Carmel Self Serv., Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 176, 178 (T.T.A.B. 1978).
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to both a chicken limb as well as the female body. Such language is
deeply offensive and should not warrant protection as a trademark.
This, in fact, is the case under the Lanham Act's bar on offensive
trademarks.9 3 But Gordon's no-harm proviso suggests that since it
does not affect individual expression there might not be grounds to
deny extension of legal protection. What is affected by demeaning
women is the quality of public language in general, the cultural
commons still under public control. Women feel unable to ex-
press themselves freely in an environment where language is
charged with sexist meanings. The public authorship model pro-
posed in this paper would allow the public to retain the power of
trademark regulation.
Second-in-time public arguments place the public in an odd
position. A private individual can enclose part of the cultural com-
mons without consent. But the public must make an affirmative
claim demonstrating harm in order to regain access to the com-
mons. This hardly seems fair. In the next section, it will be argued
that a Lockean framework allows use of the commons by private
persons but not individual appropriation without consent.
B. Personal Self and the Cultural Commons
Property, Locke tells us, is created through the intermingling
of labor with an object. In the original state of nature, the body is
the sole owned property. Thus, labor emerges from a self where
there is unquestionable self-proprietorship. The relationship be-
tween self and other is at the heart of Locke's system. However,
most considerations of Lockean notions of intellectual property ig-
nore the discussion of both language and the self in An Essay Con-
cerning Human Understanding.4 Three arguments will be made.
First, already existing proprietary rights over the person mean an
evolving self (the "Personal Self" argument). This requires symbols
from the cultural commons to place the self in relation to others.
Second, language is always based upon association of word with
object that requires consent (the "Linguistic Association-Consent"
argument). Third, while a state-of-nature commons can be appro-
priated for private use without the agreement of others, a com-
mons in a civil society requires consent (the "Commons through
Compact" argument). Trademark is only found in the context of a
civil society.
93 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (1994).
94 See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSrANDING (Peter H. Nidditch
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1690).
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Locke distinguishes between personal identity and personal
self. Personal identity is the unchanging essence of an individual,
independent of external reality. It is personal identity that ensures
someone of being a prince even after he exchanges clothes with a
pauper. Personal self, on the other hand, is a conscious self depen-
dent upon externals. 95 It is personal self which might be trans-
formed through a relationship with the other while appropriating
property or interacting with others in a civil society. Personal self is
a creature of culture.
Following Gordon's ideas, it can be argued that privatizing cul-
ture violates Locke's no-harm provision. Robinson Crusoe can ap-
propriate his desert island through building a stockade or
cultivating the soil. But his tale depends upon a long tradition of
castaway narratives, stories of marvelous possessions, and language
itself that must be as accessible for others as it is for him. Yet the
"personal self argument" suggests that there is another kind of
harm beyond expression. This harm is the inability to transform
the self into another self. In the Lockean schema a person is
owned by himself or herself from the beginning. The making of
the personal self requires interaction with others mediated through
external culture. Otherwise that self becomes stunted.96
Trademarks, as argued in the critique of Schechterian func-
tionalism,97 allow the contextualization of the person with a broad
social milieu. A contextual redefining of personhood is at risk if
part of the commons is enclosed because of lost access to symbols
(like trademarks) that place the self in relation to others. The
MacPherson possessive self comes from acquiring real property
and the expressive self develops into other selves through interac-
tion within the framework of the cultural commons.
The "Linguistic-Association-Consent" argument states that lan-
guage is different than real property because its appropriation al-
ways demands consent. For Locke, words are "Signs of internal
Conceptions... [and] Ideas within his own mind .... -9 Each indi-
vidual determines the marks for ideas or objects within his own
mind. Language begins as an internal system of nomenclature.
But sharing that nomenclature creates a common language. It is
95 See id. bk. II, ch. 27, §§ 1, 9.
96 See C. FRED ALFORD, THE SELF IN SOCIAL THEORY: A PSYCHOANALYrIC AccouNT OF ITS
CONSTRUCTION IN PLATO, HOBBES, LOCKE, RAwLS, AND RoussEAu 112-39 (1991) (arguing
that the Lockean self is predicated upon an idealization of acquisition and domination of
others through property). My argument is that intermixing, with other selves more than
with property, lies at the heart of the Lockean self.
97 See supra Part I.
98 LOCKE, supra note 94, bk. III, ch. 1, § 2.
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this second aspect of creating language that makes it dependent
upon the "use or consent" of others. Even the Emperor Augustus,
Locke tells us, could not make a Latin word without the acknowl-
edgment of the public at large.9 9 What Locke is describing is a
cultural commons. But there is a critical difference between Lock-
ean real property in a state-of-nature commons and the cultural
commons. The difference is that appropriation of real property
commons can take place without the assent of others. Acquiring
cultural property requires consent.
The idea of trademarks as language requires precisely the
same consent. Just because a manufacturer feels that steel wool
pads should be called Brillo does not make that name part of the
common language without broad agreement. In Locke's concep-
tion of language, two stages take place. First, there is an associa-
tion of the idea with the word in the individual mind. Second,
there is an association of individual with individual to make the
word part of a common vocabulary. Lockean associational inven-
tion of language shares a remarkable similarity to the model of au-
thorship this essay outlines for trademarks. If language or
trademarks are made through consent, it should logically follow
that they cannot be alienated without consent. Robert Filmer
mocked Lockean notions of consent because it would be impossi-
ble for everyone to gather in the same place at the same time.'0°
But, linguistic consent for new words or trademarks is compara-
tively easy to establish. Culture and language is ultimately a collec-
tive enterprise.
Finally, the "Compact through Consent" argument suggests
that private appropriation is limited in civil society and that the
cultural commons is a creature of civil society. Locke's appropria-
tion in a state of nature has often been seen as a recipe for estab-
lishing ownership in any commons. But that is not the case.
Locke, in fact, does not claim all common land to be alienable. He
distinguishes between two conditions, America and England. Land
in America is still largely in a state of nature. Subject to the provi-
sions of neither wasting land nor harming others, this land may be
appropriated for private use. England, on the other hand, has a
commons that cannot be appropriated readily. "In land that is
common in England or any other country where there are plenty
of people under government who have money and commerce, no
one can enclose or appropriate any part without the consent of all
99 Id. §§ 2, 8.
100 See Waldron, supra note 87, at 151.
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his fellow commoners because this is left common by compact." 10 1
In America the commons precedes civil society, in England it
follows the association of individuals with one another. Locke is
unclear whether language is a precondition or a consequence of
the creation of civil society. 102 While real property may or may not
be found in a state of nature, I would argue that intellectual prop-
erty is always a product of civil society. Certainly, social interaction
in a civil society creates language and culture. The purpose of
property rights in a state of nature like America is to allow exploita-
tion in order to maximize wealth. On the other hand, property
rights in a civil society (Locke's England) are also meant to regu-
late interaction between individuals. This regulation is subject to
the rules set down by the majority. Left common by compact,
trademarks as language can only be appropriated through consent.
Within a Lockean framework, intellectual property is different
than real property according to a three-pronged argument. First,
only intellectual property is critical for the development of the per-
sonal self. Other kinds of sustenance are fungible in a Lockean
milieu through a pair of means: (1) the "American" commons
where vast amounts of uncultivated land diminish the particular
advantages of each potential plot, and (2) the currency-based mar-
ket economy where the owner of real property can provide food-
stuffs similar to what one can grow oneself. Neither of these
fungible forms, it has been argued, apply to intellectual property.
Second, only intellectual property is subject to Locke's notion
that language is created through consent to symbol-object associa-
tions. These associations created through consent require consent
to alienate as well. Third, only intellectual property is always a
commons established through compact. It arises as something that
might be exchanged under civil society and not within a state-of-
nature. Unlike Locke's acorns, cultural symbols can never be fully
unowned.
Not all contemporary theories of justice are equally compati-
ble with this communitarian understanding of intellectual property
or trademark creation. John Rawls, for example, strips the self of
interests, individual values, and relationships with others. 10 3 Rawl-
sian property is called "primary goods."' 4 These are whatever "any
101 LOCKE, supra note 79, ch. 5, § 35.
102 LOCKE, supra note 94, bk. III, ch. 2, § 1 (stating that "[c]omfort and advantage of
society... [cannot] be had without communication of thoughts"); id. bk. III, ch. ix, § 3
(asserting that language upholds "common conversation and commerce about the ordi-
nary affairs and conveniences of civil life").
103 SeeJoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62 (1971).
104 Id.
1999]
32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT
rational man would want."' 5 But, as argued above, intellectual
property is property most reflective of the self. While most rational
people would want something as beautiful as an original Kandinsky
painting, his art is reflective of himself and limits might be im-
posed on the power of the state to demand alienation of this art.
Similarly, for trademarks there is something that the self is depen-
dent upon for its full development. Ironically, as Michael Sandel
has pointed out, the need to develop a self with all its relationships
creates the need for collective or communitarian notions of prop-
erty'0 6 (and, I would argue, even more for intellectual property).
There is another reason the model for trademark acquisition
is different than for real property. Real property is appropriated by
mixing with labor. Trademarks are a variation on this theme with a
substantial difference. The first stage of trademark creation takes
place when the laboring self is intermixed with others. The inter-
mixing of selves creates a cultural commons. This is a precondi-
tion for the second phase of intermixing of language (or
trademark) with object. In the next section, these Lockian notions
of consent will be seen as embedded within trademark doctrine.
IV. THE PUBLIC ROLE IN TRADEMARK DOCTRINE
Trademark doctrine demonstrates a notable reliance upon
public perception. The power invested in the public is largely as-
sociative: the power to identify a sign with an object to the exclu-
sion of others. Part IV is divided in two sections. The first section,
"Making and Unmaking through Association," discusses establish-
ing meaning for trademarks and how that meaning might be lost.
The second section, "Meaning in Context," explores how associa-
tive meaning changes in different linguistic markets.
A. Making and Unmaking Through Association
1. Using the Usable Part of the Cultural Commons
"Recognition and association are the cornerstones of secon-
dary meaning."'0 7 "Secondary meaning," wrote one appellate
105 Ild.; see also ALFORD, supra note 96, at 140-55. Two major critiques of this Rawlsian
deracinated self may be found in CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF
MODERN IDENTITY (1989), and MICHAELJ. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE
(1982). Although this is not the place for a full-scale critique of Robert Nozick, it should
be mentioned that Nozick's critique of redistributional justice ignores the existence of a
Lockean commons that might be used as a source for redistributing the fruit of that com-
mons. See NOziCK, supra note 86, at 149-82.
1o6 See SANDEL, supra notel05.
107 SmithKline Bechman Corp. v. Pemex Prods. Co., 605 F. Supp. 746, 750 (E.D.Pa.
1985).
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judge, "has been defined as association, nothing more. '"108 Almost
no other element of trademark doctrine so embodies the idea of
establishing text through association and so underscores the public
role in authorship. Unlike distinctive marks like "Kodak," sugges-
tive marks require secondary meaning to become descriptive
marks. For example, a dish washing soap called "Pleasant deter-
gent" requires further association to transform the descriptive term
"pleasant" into a particular product name. 10 9 It may be defined as
the association by the consuming public of a once independent
word/symbol with a product that transforms the word/symbol into
a distinctive mark. Producers must speak to the consumer through
associative language of symbol/object. The consumers must see
the disassociated symbol as invested with meaning, even where the
object is not present.110
Trademark creation is a two-step process. First, a producer af-
fixes a symbol to the product. Second, the public associates the
symbol with the product. The producer affixing a symbol might be
called primary meaning while secondary meaning embodies the
idea of public association. This association takes place in the midst
of a market where linguistic exchange parallels the transfer of
goods."' Both the producer and the consuming public are joint
authors.
It seems puzzling that recognition in addition to first-in-time
use by a manufacturer or marketer should be necessary to establish
the suitability of a trademark. Secondary meaning does not ad-
dress utilitarian rationales for trademark doctrine including com-
mercial regulation and Schechter's potential injury coming from
the use of the mark.'12 Traditional fraud or palming off claims can
be used to regulate commerce while misappropriation doctrine
would grant relief for injury to the trademark holder. It might be
108 Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 802 (9th Cir. 1970). See
also The American Angus Ass'n v. Sysco Corp., 829 F. Supp. 807, 827 (E.D.N.C. 1993)
(stating that "the prime element of secondary meaning is association between the alleged
mark and a single source of the product"); Visser v. Macres, 29 Cal. Rptr. 367, 370 (1963)
(holding that secondary meaning is acquired when the public "submerges the primary
meaning of the name .. .in favor of its meaning as a word, identifying that business.");
McCARTHY, supra note 35, § 1502.
109 See Clinton Detergent Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 302 F.2d 745 (C.C.P.A. 1962)
(deciding a similar case involving Joy Detergent).
110 See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1980) (acknowl-
edging "mental recognition" that different products with same mark come from same
source).
111 See Coca-Cola Co. v. Seven-Up Co., 497 F.2d 1351 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (holding that "Un-
cola" lacks linguistic meaning until acquired in marketplace).
112 See Stephen L. Carter, Does it Matter Whether Intellectual Property is Property?, 68 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 715 (1993).
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argued that secondary meaning demonstrates a trademark's worth
to the public and, therefore, justifies the cost of employing legal
resources to protect it. But why, then, is it not a requirement for
fanciful marks. There is no reason why a product called "Ineptie"
should not warrant the same protection as one labeled "Mr.
Clean."113
To explain the doctrine of secondary meaning it is necessary
to return to natural rights theory. Secondary meaning recognizes
that the public is granting a right through its creative association of
the object with the mark. There are two ways of understanding
this. First, it might be proposed that the public fully transfers a
word from the storehouse of common language to a private party
for the purpose of trade. As discussed earlier, addition of language
to a Lockean cultural commons requires consent. Locke did not
discuss alienation. He discussed how language is added through
use. But, how would consent for alienation be acquired? Does
consent to alienate demand a higher standard of agreement than
consent to increase the linguistic dimensions of the cultural com-
mons? 14 As Justice Stevens has stated, "language, even in a com-
mercial context, properly belongs to the public .. ."11' This
solution is troubling because it assumes a substantial permanent
alienation of part of the public's linguistic-symbolic heritage. It
would be difficult to later return and claim harm due to loss of that
piece of common culture.
Secondary meaning might also be seen as the construction of
a new word from a number of sources including a pre-existing Eng-
lish word, a product with its affixed label fabricated by a producer,
and the interpretive associational power of the public. According
to Locke, if language is a symbolic representation of an idea, then
descriptive trademarks do not take language but draw upon it for
marketing. The "pleasant" of the dish detergent company simply
looks like the common word "pleasant" in English. But pleasant
113 It might further be argued that secondary meaning is necessary because if the mark
had no meaning it would simply be Babel and, as such, unworthy of protection. However,
we do protect Babel in copyright. It is possible to copyright utter nonsense, poorly crafted
or even unintelligible expression. If trademark is not Paradise Lost, not every copyrightable
nonsense tale is The Walrus and the Carpenter.
114 See Long Island-Airports Limousine Service Corp. v. New York Airport Services Corp.,
641 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (rejecting the establishment of secondary meaning for
Long-Island Airports Limousine because it was established during a period of monopoly).
This case is puzzling unless one interprets the court's decision as being concerned primar-
ily with free consent as a prerequisite for establishing secondary meaning. Moreover, even
inherently distinctive marks may be strengthened through wider recognition. See McGre-
gor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1979).
115 Park'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 215 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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may evoke very different images, from a Sunday in the country to a
meal with a friend. Prior to the introduction of this particular dish
soap, no one would associate pleasant with washing dishes. But
that is precisely the point. The mark is really a newly created sym-
bol constituted by a tightly bound sign-product association.
The two words, then, are "pleasant" (English term represent-
ing enjoyment) and "Pleasant-detergent" (commercial term for a
particular kind of dish soap). The sign "Pleasant-Detergent" would
be conjured up in advertising, attached to a product, or bandied
about within market settings. This suggests the limits of public
alienation of its creation. "Pleasant Detergent" is not a Lockean res
nullius, an unowned piece of property. It was created by the public
association of a pre-existing word and an already owned object.
Unlike fanciful or arbitrary names like "Kodak" or "Exxon," it was
not the result of a sole party's labor. Thus, under Lockean natural
rights theory, public entitlement of this newly coined phrase
should be retained for use outside of its single commercial
association.11 6
Compare this kind of linguistic association elaborated for de-
scriptive marks with suggestive marks. Descriptive marks convey an
immediate idea of the product. "Wheaties" consists of wheat,
"Oatnut" is bread made of oats and nuts." 7 "Pentomino" is a dom-
ino with five sides."1 8 Suggestive marks require "'thought and per-
ception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods.""' 9
"Chicken-of-the-Sea" is only suggestive because one might not nec-
essarily conjure up an image of tuna without a leap of imagination.
It might be expected that greater imagination would lead to a
larger public role in the creation of suggestive marks. 12° But the
116 On occasion, courts have employed arguments that resonate with Lockean logic. See,
e.g., Otto Roth & Co. v. Universal Foods Corp., 640 F.2d 1317 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (recognizing
the importance of "free use" of language); Bada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 426 F.2d
8, 11 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding that one "competitor will not be permitted to impoverish
the language of commerce by preventing his fellows from fairly describing their own
goods"). Every kind of intellectual property requires participants, users, to acquire value.
What makes trademarks different is that they require participants to acquire meaning.
117 See In re Entenmann's Inc., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1750 (P.T.T.A.B. 1990).
118 See Golomb v. Wadsworth, 592 F.2d 1184 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
119 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4,11 (2d Cir. 1976) (quot-
ing Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfgs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y.
1968)).
120 Two tests exist for distinguishing between descriptive and suggestive marks, the Com-
petitors Needs Test and the Competitors Use Test. The Competitors Needs Test evaluates
the amount of imagination required to interpret the trademark. The more imagination
required, the less likely the words or symbols will be needed by competitors. See Union
Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1976). The Competitors Use Test
asks whether competitors employed these words or symbols when describing their product.
See Shoe Corp. of Am. v. Juvenile Shoe Corp. Of Am., 266 F.2d 793 (C.C.P.A. 1959); Fire-
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imaginative leap is really made by the producer, and the public
simply follows suit. The producer is the one who calls suntan lo-
tion "Coppertone," creating a linguistic association that might en-
rich the cultural commons. 21 It makes sense according to
Lockean natural rights to reward the suggestive mark with stronger
initial protection against other commercial entities than a descriptive
trademark.
Association still needs to be recognized by the public and the
public should retain its entitlement for non-market uses. Descrip-
tive marks borrow heavily from the linguistic commons and require
public recognition through secondary meaning before warranting
commercial protection. On the other hand, descriptive and arbitrary
marks warrant early protection prior to use from commercial inter-
ference. This is because they are based upon either linguistic (ar-
bitrary marks) inventiveness, such as renaming New York
Telephone "Nynex," or imagistic inventiveness, such as associating
the color of tanned skin with the burnished color of metal that is
reminiscent of the bronze age. Yet through use of arbitrary or sug-
gestive marks they take on additional cultural meanings. In no
cases can the public fully alienate linguistic creation from the Lock-
ean cultural commons once it has entered common usage.
2. Unusable Part of the Cultural Commons
Public entitlement for trademark is based upon two principles.
First, certain public inheritances, like descriptive marks, take on
commercial meaning through public association. Second, in certain
other trademarks, such as arbitrary or suggestive marks, producers
take upon themselves a larger role in their commercial creation.
Afterbeing exchanged as commercial entities, these become part of
the Lockean cultural commons. The fanciful mark "Oreo" was in-
troduced into the commercial sphere as the name of a cookie. But
African-Americans adopted it to refer to those who are black on
the outside, white on the inside. In that form, the word is fully part
of the cultural commons.
Finally, there are marks which cannot be made commercial
because their cultural meaning is either collective or their use
would be so offensive to the collective. The Lanham Act 12 2 prohib-
its registration of a number of types of trademarks on the basis of
stone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 557 (1970);
McCARTHY, supra note 35, § 11.21.
121 See Douglas Lab. v. Copper Tan, Inc., 210 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1954).
122 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052-72, 1091-96, 1111-27 (1994).
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content. These prohibitions include purely descriptive marks, 12 1
marks that are primarily surnames,124 and geographic names if the
secondary meaning exception cannot be met.1 25 Moreover, the
Lanham Act excludes registration of "immoral, deceptive, or scan-
dalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a
connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or na-
tional symbols, or bring them into contempt or disrepute. 126
These limitations express the problem of associating a symbol/
name with meaning if meaning already exists. For example, sur-
names are arbitrary designations for an individual. This person is
called Abercrombie rather than Fitch. In a sense, then, Abercrom-
bie is a trademark for persons, shared within an exclusive semi-
public domain by everyone named Abercrombie. The number of
people with that name may increase (Abercrombies pass down the
mark to their children or share with a spouse or Fitches may
change their name to Abercrombie) but it is applied solely to this
limited set of individuals. Different Abercrombies are distin-
guished in a variety of ways. There is Alexander Abercrombie, Ber-
tram Abercrombie, the Abercrombie from New York, the
Abercrombie from Boston, Abercrombie the professor, and Aber-
crombie the insurance salesman. Because human beings are singu-
lar and found within local settings there is little confusion (though
occasionally one has to resort to middle names for someone with
the common appellation of Smith).
But the association is between person and name. Using it as
the designation for a product requires wresting it away from its sole
connection to individual identity and attaching it to a physical ob-
ject. Such a reassociation is legitimate because the naming of the
self is really one communicative channel and the association with a
commercial product is another. In the case of celebrities, however,
the name has become commercialized. Self and the commons
have intermingled. It therefore would be prohibited to name a
perfume after Elizabeth Taylor while there would be no problem
using a name already in currency for an ordinary individual. For
ordinary persons, the name is arbitrary or fanciful (this individual
is an "Abercrombie") but for products it becomes a descriptive
term (Abercrombie's may be translated as the restaurant owned by
Abercrombie). Consequently, secondary meaning is required to
reestablish this new association.
123 See id. § 1052(e) (1).
124 See id. § 1052(e) (4).
125 See id. § 1052(e) (3).
126 Id. § 1052(a).
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A public role is also required because the extension of the Ab-
ercrombie name to a restaurant encroaches upon the entitlement
of every other Abercrombie. Another member of the Abercrombie
family would be barred from opening a restaurant with the same
name in the city. In a recent case, for example, Joseph Gallo
(brother of the Gallos who own Gallo Winery) was prohibited from
using his surname on packaged cheeses). 27 Unlike surnames,
there is no secondary meaning requirement for historical names.
While Michelangelo will be unaffected by a paint store named in
his honor, the entitlement of everyone bearing the Abercrombie
name diminishes if it is called Abercrombie. A secondary meaning
requirement means that public use of language (its perception and
associational power) trumps limited group entitlements to names.
Geographic terms also touch upon a limited group entitle-
ment. To reserve the term "New York" or even a colloquial phrase
like "knickerbocker" for association with just one product would
diminish the entitlement of other commercial entities that wish to
identify their place of origin. The phrase "New York" belongs to all
New Yorkers. Nevertheless, the public's secondary meaning can
trump the limited entitlement of New Yorkers. In a recent case, a
manufacturer was barred from calling its cream cheese "Penn-
sylvania" because the public would have been confused by the simi-
larity of the mark to an already valid trademark established
through secondary meaning, Philadelphia Brand Cream Cheese.128
The bar against using national or religious symbols and im-
moral marks, however, underscores the limits of mark making. It
prohibits registration for trademarks which "falsely suggest a con-
nection" with such public symbols as flags, religious images, or na-
tional emblems and seals. 12' The language of the Lanham Act is
telling. All connections are false because it is problematic to associ-
ate national or religious symbols with private commercial ventures.
While public association at times trumps limited group entitle-
ments, the public is unwilling to make private its own linguistic and
cultural commons.
The immoral mark clause of the Lanham Act' demonstrates
the boundaries placed upon public association by prohibiting "im-
moral" or "scandalous" marks. The public is willing to contribute
to the associative creation of an ordinary commercial mark where
127 See E. &J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1992); see also
Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1976).
128 See Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. BC-USA, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 344 (E.D.Pa. 1993).
129 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
],"o Id.
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it will reap the advantage of diminishing consumer confusion but
remains reluctant to associate the object with something lewd.
Such prohibitions exist when calling brassieres "bubby trap" or us-
ing the slogan "only a breast in the mouth is better than a leg in
the hand" for a chicken limb.'31 Once again, the measure of
whether to engage in associational joint making of a trademark is
dependent upon public perception: first, whether the public finds
the phrase or depiction lewd when seen alone (genitalia or sexual
relations may always be seen as inappropriate for commercial use);
second, its meaning as seen in association with the product. 13 2 Li-
bido, for example, was determined as a permissible trademark for
perfume because the use of fragrances is often charged with
sexuality.' 33
An intriguing rationale may be made for the bar against lewd
trademarks. Since women are a community with public rights, the
public would not consent to a creative associative act making trade-
marks which subject a member to offensive sexual innuendo. Wo-
men would be granted standing to challenge the use of "booby
trap" much as commercial competitors have the right to oppose
registration of confusing or similar trademarks. In these cases
there is confusion of a different sort, symbolic intermingling of
commercial and sexual spheres.3 4  Recent scholarship has at-
tacked the immoral mark clause as having a chilling effect on free
speech.' 35 The argument here, however, is that registration re-
flects state action less than it does the withholding of public aid in
the joint creation of a mark. Offensive language would have a cor-
rosive affect on the cultural commons.
3. Unmaking Trademarks
Nothing underscores the authorial power of public association
more than its ability to unmake trademarks. By becoming generic,
131 In re Runsdorf, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (P.T.T.A.B. 1971); Bromberg v. Carmel Self
Serv., Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 176, 178 (T.T.A.B. 1978).
132 See In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327 (C.C.P.A. 1938) (determining that a
wine could not be called Madonna because of the improper association with alcohol).
This case has become the touchstone for examining Immoral Mark issues as questions of
association.
133 See Ex parte Parfum L'Orle, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q 481 (BNA) (1952).
134 On the problem of confusing these spheres, see MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUS-
TICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALITY AND EQUALITY 3-30 (1983). My analysis here dovetails with
that of CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993).
135 See Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Registration of Scandalous, Immoral, and Disparaging Matter
Under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act: Can One Man's Vulgarity be Another's Registered Trade-
mark?, 54 OHio ST. L.J. 331 (1993); Robert N. Kravitz, supra note 6; Robert C. Denicola,
Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of
Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 158 (1982).
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aspirin, cellophane, thermos, and other trademarks have lost their
distinctive meaning.1 36 Thermos, once a specific trademark, was
applied to other vacuum-sealed containers that keep liquids at a
constant temperature.137 Public association of a mark with a broad
variety of similar products means that a sign or symbol becomes
part of a public domain. But it is not a sudden transfer of rights
from a private holder of the trademark to a linguistic commons.
For example, the first holder of "Shredded Wheat" only had "de
facto secondary meaning."' 38 The Supreme Court held that the
mark was generic. 139 This means that the public never associated
the symbol with the object of a particular producer but merely with
the general type of goods. At the time Shredded Wheat was pro-
duced by just one company, the name referred to that company
alone. As other companies began to produce similar cereal bis-
cuits, there was no particular or distinct association with the pro-
ducer to prevent that association from spreading to all makers of
the same sort of products. 4 °
B. Meaning in Context
This essay has argued that the authorial role of the public has
created a public domain. Authorship legitimizes the public power
to determine what will or will not be a protected trademark. It is
established through association. This section will contrast compet-
ing doctrinal developments in trademark law. One development
challenges the emphasis on public-derived meaning and the other
seeks to deepen that meaning through contextualizing it within a
linguistic market.
The creation of secondary meaning as well as the use of inher-
ently distinctive trade dress have both come under attack. Some-
times secondary meaning cannot be proved because a product is in
an early stage of marketing. To claim injunctive relief, holders of
trademarks have argued for secondary meaning in the making.
Secondary meaning in the making is defined as a presumption that
meaning will develop in the future. 4 ' No requirement is made to
136 See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); DuPont Cellophane
Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936).Jacqueline Stern, Genericide: Cancellation
of Registered Trademarks, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 666 (1983).
'37 See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963).
138 See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119 (1938).
139 See id. at 117.
140 See id. at 120; DuPont, 85 F.2d at 81 (holding that no matter how much money was
spent in marketing to ensure that cellophane would not be deemed generic, "so far as it
did not succeed in actually converting the world to its gospel, it can have no relief').
141 See Willajeanne F. McLean, The Birth, Death, & Renaissance of the Doctrine of Secondary
Meaning in the Making, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 737 (1993); Timothy R.M. Bryant, Trademark
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demonstrate how the mark is presently perceived by the public.
Secondary meaning in the making is largely based upon the intent
of the person who seeks exclusive use for a trademark. As one
judge has pointed out, secondary meaning in the making is "fo-
cused solely upon the intent and actions of the seller of the prod-
uct to the exclusion of the consuming public." '42  Secondary
meaning in the making relies upon the intent of the producer.
Are there plans to invest in advertising? Will the product be mar-
keted soon? As has been argued in the section on functionalism, 4 '
a large chasm stands between marketing and public cultural mean-
ing. The second doctrine I wish to discuss, inherently distinctive
trade dress, relies upon a reading of the product itself.
In the recent case of Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana Int'l Inc.,14 4 the
Supreme Court examined whether trade dress infringement could
be found without a determination of consumer confusion. Two
Mexican eating establishments shared a similar menu, floor plan,
and interior decor. The restaurants were built around patios and
were decorated with murals. Both used bright, festive colors. Find-
ing that the decor of the first restaurant was "inherently distinc-
tive," the Court held that the first restaurant was unique enough
that questions of secondary meaning were irrelevant.145 This deci-
sion places at risk the traditional public role in making trademarks.
Both secondary meaning in the making and inherently distinc-
tive arguments have been questioned by courts and scholars. They
are seen as handing advantages to existing trademark holders that
crowd out new entrants. 14 6 More importantly for the argument
here, they do apparent violence to the public role in making trade-
marks. These doctrines see the trademark holder as the sole au-
thor. Yet the idea of assuming public reaction based upon
marketing is very troubling. Without the association of the trade
Infringement: The Irrelevance of Evidence of Copying to Secondary Meaning, 83 Nw. U. L. REV.
(1989); National Lampoon, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 376 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
142 Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg. Co., 684 F.2d 546, 550 (8th
Cir. 1982).
143 See supra Part II.
144 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
145 See id. Such analysis reduces secondary meaning into something of contingent im-
portance. See Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695 (5th
Cir. 1981) (requiring a demonstration of secondary meaning only when it was determined
that the trade dress was not sufficiently distinctive). How distinctive is distinctive enough is
hard to show. See Publications Int'l, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., No. 98-1490, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 31382 ( 7 th Cir.) ("[C]ourts have struggled to articulate a standard for when a trade
dress is sufficiently distinctive to be entitled to the prima facie protection of the Lanham
Act.").
146 See generally Carter, supra note 112; Black & Decker, 684 F.2d 546.
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dress with a symbol identifying the source, how can there be secon-
dary meaning and, consequently, likelihood of confusion?1 47 In
Two Pesos, Justice Thomas claimed that "the first user of an arbi-
trary package, like the first user of an arbitrary word, should be
entitled to the presumption that his package represents him with-
out having to show that it does so in fact."' 48 Yet as has been shown
above, trademark common law has commonly held that represen-
tation of descriptive marks requires the acknowledgment of an
outside viewer. As Locke suggested, a person can claim to invent a
word but unless that linguistic change takes hold, it is meaningless.
Justice Thomas has confused claims and meaning.
Secondary meaning in the making and inherently distinctive
arguments are non-contextual. These doctrines understand trade-
marks or trade dress as symbols outside of a context of communica-
tion between producer and consumer. Focusing upon intent of
the producer (secondary meaning in the making) or distinctive-
ness of product (inherently distinctive) is problematic. Just be-
cause a producer intends or even takes action to market a product
does not mean that this attempt will be successful. The doctrine of
generic trademarks is an example of the thwarting of producer in-
tent. The Court in Two Pesos did not examine the differences that
might arise from trade dress for a service (where face-to-face con-
tact takes place) as opposed to an object nor did it ask whether
Mexican decor is not a logical direction for any Mexican restaurant
to follow.
Without reference to the public, it is clear that the decision in
Two Pesos only protects the holder of the mark, not the public,
from commercial confusion. The intent examined should be that
of the individuals seeking to follow the lead of the first holder. Is
this a conscious attempt to copy a successful business venture? Is
free-ridership intended? If this was the case, a bad faith action
could be initiated. For questions of distinctiveness, it should be the
understanding of the public that determines whether products are
distinctive enough, not an objective standard. The objective stan-
dard of Two Pesos concentrates on the "total image of the busi-
ness."' 4 9 Yet distinctiveness for an interpretive community might
very well lie in the details. Perhaps the wearing of large Sombreros
by waiters or even serving a dish as a specialty of the house is suffi-
cient to set off one restaurant from another. There is no objective
147 See Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1036 (S.D.N.Y.), affd in part, vacated
in part & rev'd in part, 964 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1992).
148 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 787.
149 Id. at 765.
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standard for the cultural distinctions found by consumers. 5 ° Not
only has this essay tried to argue for a broader understanding of
authorship (including the public as well as the producer who de-
termines the packaging), but also for a more dynamic definition of
a trademark. A trademark is not simply a phrase or symbol or
trade dress. It is not what might be thought of as a word of sorts.
Instead, it is the product of an act of dynamic communication.
Two types of association have been described above: (1) initial
meaning, where the producer affixes a sign to a package, and (2)
secondary meaning, where the public associates sign and product
as connected. What will be proposed now is a third kind of associa-
tion: Tertiary meaning. The tertiary meaning is the placing of a
sign-symbol in a context.
A publisher could affix the phrase "red book" to a particular
work. When a reader sees a reference to this red book, the reader
only thinks about Chairman Mao. Yet much later that reader
comes across a plum book. The Plum Book describes legal jobs
available in the federal government. This book has little to do with
Mao's reference (he might even be horrified by any suggestion of
similarity) other than perhaps playing on the idea of a colored
cover. The plum is a pun on plum jobs. In the context of tertiary
meaning the Plum Book is completely distinct from Mao's Red
Book.
Contexts come in a variety of forms. It is possible to divide the
contextual use of language into three kinds: (1) to whom said? (2)
about what said? (3) how said?15' When someone says "how are
you" to a critically ill friend it has a very different meaning than
when it is said to a stranger in passing. When speaking about a
coffee as robust, it means something very different than talking
about an Olympic athlete. Or, finally, when someone says "I could
kill you for that," it means something very different if said in a con-
text of humor or anger. The lion of Dreyfuss investment services is
not the same as the cowardly lion of the Wizard of Oz.' 52 All this
seems obvious. But it has been difficult for courts to contextualize
language in quite this way.
150 Compare id., with Haagen-Dazs, Inc. v. Frusen Gladje, Ltd., 493 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). In Haagen-Dazs, the court stated that the plaintiff did not have an exclusive right to
a unique marketing theme. These cases constitute inherently distinctive approaches to the
copyright doctrine of substantial similarity.
151 I have not addressed the question of multiple linguistic markets based upon differing
sophistication and expertise. Children, for example, are much more susceptible to confu-
sion. Professional, well-educated consumers are less likely to blur distinctions. See Mead
Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
152 See Dreyfus Fund Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1117 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
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Some recent decisions, however, have moved in this direction.
The question in Nike v. 'Just Did it" Enterprises53 is "to whom said?"
A mail-order entrepreneur parodied the Nike t-shirt reading 'Just
do it" with an. emblem saying "Mike."'1 4 Advertisements for the
shirt were sent only to people with the first name of Mike. Even
though the word Mike looked very much like Nike from a short
distance, the court held there was no confusion. Writing only to a
discrete population and only through the mail, trademark as con-
textualized language was spoken only to certain people.'55 The
trade channels were substantially different.'56
On the other hand, courts can be confused about "to whom
said?" In Playboy Enterprises v. Chuckleberry Publishing,'57 Playboy
sought relief against the publishing of a voyeuristic magazine enti-
tled "Playman."15 8 Playboy had failed to act against other publish-
ing ventures like Playgirl, an analogous erotic magazine directed
towards women. 1 9 The case might have been resolved by applying
crowded field doctrine. Surrounded by numerous similar marks, a
trademark cannot be very distinctive. But the court determined
that Playboy was aimed at a heterosexual market and only would
recognize competing signs meant for heterosexual men. 6 ° Here,
unfortunately, context was drawn in a terribly narrow fashion.
Scottish Whisky Ass'n v. Watson16' addresses the question of
"about what said?" Black Watch Scotch was made in America but
every attempt was made to link it with Scotland. 162 Its label bore
the regimental badge of the Scottish Black Watch Regiment, this-
tles, and the word "Highlands.'1 63 It spelled "whisky" without an
"e" as is the case for Scottish whiskeys, not with an "e" as is the
usual usage for American produced liquors. Claiming that the
product prompted deceptive confusion, it was argued that consum-
ers would think that the liquor actually came from Scotland. 164 Yet
the context (and the tertiary meaning) was meant to be evocative
153 6 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1993).
154 See id. at 1226. In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Florists Ass'n of Greater Cleveland, 603 F. Supp.
35 (N.D.Ohio 1984), florists used the advertising phrase "this bud's for you," with strong
references to a Budweiser Beer slogan. The court decided that the difference between
flowers and beer markets argued against trademark confusion.
155 See Nike, 6 F.3d at 1230.
156 See id.
157 486 F. Supp. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
158 See id. at 418.
159 See id. at 421.
160 See id.
161 958 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1992).
162 See id. at 598.
163 See id. at 595.
164 See id. at 596.
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of Scottish liquor, not Scotland itself. The court decided against
confusion.165
A third case, Jordache v. Hogg Wylde, Ltd.,16 6 deals with the con-
text of "how said?" The court determined that humorous speech
was different from serious speech even if both were commercial. 67
Meant for those with svelte figures, Jordache designer jeans were
parodied by a company manufacturing jeans for heavy-set wo-
men. 168 These pants were called "Lardashe." The delicate horse
insignia of Jordache was replaced with a garish pig-pocket. Swine,
in general, were the theme of this company's marketing.169 The
court felt that the use of humor established a completely different
context. 17 0 The humorous quality of parody created an associa-
tional rift between Jordache and Lardashe so that the use of a
mocking trademark was "not likely to create in the mind of con-
sumers a particularly unwholesome, unsavory, or disagreeable asso-
ciation."171 It dismissed claims of misappropriation or dilution.
The association of lardashe-to-humor was greater than that of
lardashe-to-Jordache.1 72
Association means authorship and context points to meaning.
Within trademark doctrine lies the material to construct a public
domain. During the moment of associational creation, the public
permits certain kinds of trademark privileges. The public never
alienates symbols or words from the Lockean commons because to
do so would be to lose touch with a collective self.
V. WE HAVE MET THE AUTHOR AND HE Is Us
This essay has traced a set of definitions somewhat different
than the usual depiction of trademarks. A trademark is not a word
or symbol but an association of an object with a sign. A trademark
is not authored by the production/marketing of an object in its
package but by a joint interpretive enterprise between author and
165 Id.
166 625 F. Supp. 48 (D.N.M. 1985).
167 See id. at 50.
168 See id.
169 See id.
170 See id. at 51.
171 Id. at 57.
172 See Toho Co. Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981) (allowing
use of garbage bags called Bagzilla after the ape character Godzilla); Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 746 F. 2d 112 (2d Cir. 1984) (allowing the game Donkey
Kong as a parody of King Kong); John W. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.
(6th Cir. 1983) (allowing the parody use of identifying phrase for toilets); Girl Scouts of
the United States of America v. Personality Posters, Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (allowing a poster of a pregnant Girl Scout with the Girl Scout phrase "Be
Prepared").
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public. A trademark is not interpreted alone but always in a lin-
guistic context. The purpose behind this reinterpretation is to
carve out a public entitlement for trademarks.
This reinterpretation requires a rethinking of the very defini-
tion of intellectual property. Intellectual property is different. In
an attempt to place the accent on the "intellectual," rather than
the "property," I have discussed the ways that the public always
does (and must as a political imperative) retain a robust role in
shaping expression. If, as Jennifer Nedelsky suggests, legal notions
of property have created the bounded self,173 then intellectual
property, I believe, can serve as a model for an unbounded, collec-
tivist self. This is especially true for trademarks, as signs of a mate-
rial culture embedded in everyday life. Its abstraction of symbol as
representing a relationship, its reliance upon public readings, its
ability to seep into the many corners of our lives makes trademark,
as paradigmatic of intellectual property as a whole, a means for
connecting disparate selves.
New Republican legal theorists have struggled with the prob-
lem of what constitutes a community, often seeking to locate com-
munity in discourse.174 I have argued here for a linguistic or
interpretive community, a community with collective rights over its
cultural creation. The question, ultimately, is one of legal author-
ity. "When I use a word," said Humpty Dumpty in Through the Look-
ing Glass, "it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more
nor less. The question is which is to be the master - that's all."'' 75
173 SeeJennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162,
162-89 (1990).
174 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE LJ.
1013 (1984) (distinguishing between ordinary and constitutional politics, where constitu-
tional politics depends upon discourse aimed towards the public good and where ordinary
politics is dependent upon personal ambition); Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34
STAN L. REv. 739 (1982) (viewing legal discourse as constructing a Constitutional interpre-
tive community).
175 LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LooKING-GLAss 106-09 (Schocken Books 1987)
(1872).
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